Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production

References

• Abreu D (1988) On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica 56(2):383–396.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson EJ, Cau TDH (2009) Modeling implicit collusion using coevolution. Oper. Res. 57(2):439–455.Link, Google Scholar
• Anderson EJ, Cau TDH (2011) Implicit collusion and individual market power in electricity markets. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 211(2):403–414.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson EJ, Philpott AB (2002) Using supply functions for offering generation into an electricity market. Oper. Res. 50(3):477–489.Link, Google Scholar
• Banal-Estañol A, Rupérez-Micola A (2009) Composition of electricity generation portfolios, pivotal dynamics and market prices. Management Sci. 55(11):1813–1831.Link, Google Scholar
• Bernheim BD, Whinston MD (1990) Multimarket contact and collusive behavior. RAND J. Econom. 21(1):1–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Besbes O, Maglaras C (2012) Dynamic pricing with financial milestones: Feedback-form policies. Management Sci. 58(9):1715–1731.Link, Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Scharfstein DS (1990) A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. Amer. Econom. Rev. 80(1):93–106.Google Scholar
• Brander JA, Lewis TR (1986) Oligopoly and financial structure: The limited liability effect. Amer. Econom. Rev. 76(5):956–970.Google Scholar
• Bushnell J (2003) A mixed complementarity model of hydrothermal electricity competition in the Western United States. Oper. Res. 51(1): 80–93.Link, Google Scholar
• Compte O, Jenny F, Rey P (2002) Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion. Eur. Econom. Rev. 46(1):1–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cramton P, Stoft S (2006) The convergence of market designs for adequate generating capacity. White paper, California Electricity Oversight Board, http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/cramton-stoft-market-design-for-resource-adequacy.pdf.Google Scholar
• Davidson C, Deneckere R (1990) Excess capacity and collusion. Internat. Econom. Rev. 31(3):521–541.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dechenaux E, Kovenock D (2007) Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions. RAND J. Econom. 38(4): 1044–1069.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dechenaux E, Kovenock D (2011) Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames. Econom. Theory 47(1):29–74.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eckert V (2013) Weak demand may force Eon to mothball new power stations. Reuters (March 13). Retrieved August 16, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/eon-gas-power-demand-idUSL6N0C5AKD20130313.Google Scholar
• Ernst & Young (2013) Benchmarking European power and utility asset impairments. Impairments at a high in 2013 as utility sector transforms. Retrieved October 27, 2014, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Power—Utilities/EY-benchmarking-european-power-and-utility-asset-impairments.Google Scholar
• Fabra N (2006) Collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 24(1):69–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fabra N, Toro J (2005) Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 23(3–4):155–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fabra N, von der Fehr NH, Harbord D (2006) Designing electricity auctions. The RAND J. Econom. 37(1):23–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Garcia A, Campos-Nañez E, Reitzes J (2005) Dynamic pricing and learning in electricity markets. Oper. Res. 53(2):231–241.Link, Google Scholar
• Grave K, Paulus M, Lindenberger D (2012) A method for estimating security of electricity supply from intermittent sources: Scenarios for Germany until 2030. Energy Policy 46:193–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Green RJ, Newbery DM (1992) Competition in the British electricity spot market. J. Political Econom. 100(5):929–953.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guan X, Ho YC, Pepyne DL (2002) Gaming and price spikes in electric power markets. Power Systems, IEEE Trans. 16(3):402–408.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haltiwanger J, Harrington JE (1991) The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. The RAND J. Econom. 22(1):89–106.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hobbs BF (2001) Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets. Power Systems, IEEE Trans. 16(2):194–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hobbs BF, Pang JS (2007) Nash-Cournot equilibria in electric power markets with piecewise linear demand functions and joint constraints. Oper. Res. 55(1):113–127.Link, Google Scholar
• Jing-Yuan W, Smeers Y (1999) Spatial oligopolistic electricity models with Cournot generators and regulated transmission prices. Oper. Res. 47(1):102–112.Link, Google Scholar
• Knittel CR, Lepore JJ (2010) Tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 28(2):131–144.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lambson VE (1994) Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames. J. Econom. Theory 62(2):444–468.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin Y, McGill J, Nediak M (2008) Risk in revenue management and dynamic pricing. Oper. Res. 56(2):326–343.Link, Google Scholar
• Macatangay REA (2002) Tacit collusion in the frequently repeated multi-unit uniform price auction for wholesale electricity in England and Wales. Eur. J. Law Econom. 13(3):257–273.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maksimovic V (1988) Capital structure in repeated oligopolies. RAND J. Econom. 19(3):389–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miklos-Thal J (2011) Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry. Econom. Theory 46(1):99–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mount TD, Ning Y, Cai X (2006) Predicting price spikes in electricity markets using a regime-switching model with time-varying parameters. Energy Econom. 28(1):62–80.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ofgem (2013) Electricity capacity assessment report. Ofgem, https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/75232/electricity-capacity-assessment-report-2013.pdf.Google Scholar
• Oren SS (2005) Generation adequacy via call options obligations: Safe passage to the promised land. The Electricity J. 18(9):28–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• PR Newswire (2004) TXU Power to mothball gas-fired power plant units; other gas plant operations to be optimized. (November 12). Retrieved August 16, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/txu-power-to-mothball-gas-fired-power-plant-units-other-gas-plant-operations-to-be-optimized-75372202.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Rochet J-C, Villeneuve S (2011) Liquidity risk and corporate demand for hedging and insurance. J. Financial Intermediation 20(3):300–323.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rotemberg JJ, Saloner G (1986) A supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms. Amer. Econom. Rev. 76(3):390–407.Google Scholar
• Staiger RW, Wolak FA (1992) Collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty. RAND J. Econom. 23(2):203–220.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sweeting A (2007) Market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market 1995–2000. Econom. J. 117(520):654–685.Google Scholar
• Talluri KT, Van Ryzin G (2004) The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (Springer, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Traber T, Kemfert C (2011) Gone with the wind?—Electricity market prices and incentives to invest in thermal power plants under increasing wind energy supply. Energy Econom. 33(2):249–256.Crossref, Google Scholar
• von der Fehr NHM, Harbord D (1993) Spot market competition in the UK electricity industry. Econom. J. 103(418):531–546.Google Scholar
• Wiesmann G, Clark P (2012) Eon warns on conventional power. Financial Times. (November 13). Retreived August 16, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47fe92d6-2d71-11e2-9988-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3no0EzmZR.Google Scholar
• Wolfram CD (1998) Strategic bidding in a multiunit auction: An empirical analysis of bids to supply electricity in England and Wales. The RAND J. Econom. 29(4):703–725.Crossref, Google Scholar