Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition

References

• Abraham I, Athey S, Babaioff M, Grubb M (2011) Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information. Technical report, Tech. Rep. MSRTR-2011-68, Microsoft Research. January.Google Scholar
• Athey S (2001) Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information. Econometrica 69(4):861–889.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Athey S, Levin J (1999) Information and competition in us forest service timber auctions. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Battaglini M, Lamba R (2012) Optimal dynamic contracting. Economic Theory Center Working paper, Princeton University, Princeton.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beil DR, Chen Q, Duenyas I, See BD (2015) When to deploy test auctions in sourcing. Working paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Bonatti A (2011) Targeting in advertising markets: Implications for offline versus online media. RAND J. Econom. 42(3):417–443.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Bonatti A (2015) Selling cookies. Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconom. 7(3):259–294.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Said M (2011) Dynamic auctions: A survey. Cochran J, ed. Wiley Encyclopedia Oper. Res. Management Sci. (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ), 1511–1522.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Välimäki J (2002) Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design. Econometrica 70(3):1007–1033.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhawalkar K, Hummel P, Vassilvitskii S (2014) Value of targeting. Algorithmic Game Theory (Springer, Berlin), 194–205.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Boleslavsky R, Said M (2013) Progressive screening: Long-term contracting with a privately known stochastic process. Rev. Econom. Stud. 80(1):1–34.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cremer J, Khalil F (1992) Gathering information before signing a contract. Amer. Econom. Rev. 82(3):566–578.Google Scholar
• Crémer J, Spiegel Y, Zheng CZ (2009) Auctions with costly information acquisition. Econom. Theory 38(1):41–72.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Emek Y, Feldman M, Gamzu I, Leme RP, Tennenholtz M (2012) Signaling schemes for revenue maximization. Faltings B, Leyton-Brown K, Ipeirotis P, eds. Proc. 13th ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (ACM, New York), 514–531.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eső P, Szentes B (2007) Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction. Rev. Econom. Stud. 74(3):705–731.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ghosh A, Nazerzadeh H, Sundararajan M (2007) Computing optimal bundles for sponsored search. Deng X, Graham FC, eds. Proc. 3rd Internat. Conf. Internet and Network Econom. (Springer, Berlin), 576–583.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goel A, Guha S, Munagala K (2010) How to probe for an extreme value. ACM Trans. Algorithms 7(1):Article 12.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Google AdX Documentation (2015) Private auctions overview. Accessed January 4, 2015, https://support.google.com/adxbuyer/answer/2839853?hl=en.Google Scholar
• Google DoubleClick Documentation (2016) Distinguish between the open auction, private auctions, and preferred deals. Accessed November 26, 2016, https://supports.google.com/adxseller/answer/6268312?hl=en.Google Scholar
• Guha S, Munagala K, Sarkar S (2006) Optimizing transmission rate in wireless channels using adaptive probes. Proc. Joint Internat. Conf. Measurement and Modeling Comput. Systems, SIGMETRICS (ACM, New York), 381–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hatfield JW, Kojima F, Kominers SD (2015) Strategy-proofness, investment efficiency, and marginal returns: an equivalence. Working paper, University of Texas, Austin.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hendricks K, Pinkse J, Porter RH (2003) Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. 70(1):115–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hummel P, McAfee P (2012) When does improved targeting increase revenue?. Gangemi A, Leonardi S, Panconesi A, eds. Proc. 24th Internat. Conf. World Wide Web, WWW ’15 (ACM, New York), 462–472.Google Scholar
• Jing B (2011) Exogenous learning, seller-induced learning, and marketing of durable goods. Management Sci. 57(10):1788–1801.Link, Google Scholar
• Kakade SM, Lobel I, Nazerzadeh H (2013) Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual pivot mechanism. Oper. Res. 61(4):837–854.Link, Google Scholar
• Kristol DM (2001) Http cookies: Standards, privacy, and politics. ACM Trans. Internet Technology 1(2):151–198.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Larson K, Sandholm T (2001) Costly valuation computation in auctions. Proc. 8th Conf. Theoret. Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge TARK ’01 (Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco), 169–182.Google Scholar
• Lewis G (2011) Asymmetric information, adverse selection and online disclosure: The case of eBay motors. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(4):1535–1546.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lobel I, Xiao W (2013) Optimal long-term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. Working Paper, New York University, New York.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lu J, Ye L (2014) Optimal two-stage auctions with costly information acquisition. Working paper, National University of Singapore, Singapore.Google Scholar
• McAfee RP, McMillan J (1988) Search mechanisms. J. Econom. Theory 44(1):99–123.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Muthukrishnan S (2009) Ad exchanges: Research issues. Leonardi S, eds. Proc. 5th Internat. Workshop Internet and Network Economics (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg), 1–12.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R (1986) Multistage games with communications. Econometrica 54(2):323–358.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson RB (1981) Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6(1):58–73.Link, Google Scholar
• Pancs R (2013) Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition. Games Econom. Behav. 82:522–543.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pavan A, Segal I, Toikka J (2014) Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach. Econometrica 82(2):601–653.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Quint D, Hendricks K (2012) Selecting bidders via non-binding bids when entry is costly. Working paper, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison.Google Scholar
• Rayo L, Segal I (2010) Optimal information disclosure. J. Political Econom. 118(5):949–987.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roberts JW, Sweeting A (2010) Entry and selection in auctions. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Shi X (2012) Optimal auctions with information acquisition. Games Econom. Behav. 74(2):666–686.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Syrgkanis V, Kempe D, Tardos E (2015) Information asymmetries in common-value auctions with discrete signals. Proc. 16th ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 303.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Szalay D (2009) Contracts with endogenous information. Games Econom. Behav. 65(2):586–625.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vallen MA, Bullinger CD (1999) The due diligence process for acquiring and building power plants. The Electricity J. 12(8):28–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ye L (2007) Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions. Games Econom. Behav. 58(1):181–207.Crossref, Google Scholar