Delay-Predictability Trade-offs in Reaching a Secret Goal

References

• Alpern S, Gal S (2003) The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous, Vol. 55 (Springer, New York).Google Scholar
• Avenhaus R, Von Stengel B, Zamir S (2002) Inspection games. Aumann RJ, Hart S, eds. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Vol. 3 (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 1947–1987.Google Scholar
• Boyd S, Vandenberghe L (2004) Convex Optimization (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cormen TH, Leiserson CE, Rivest RL, Stein C (2009) Introduction to Algorithms (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Cummings R, Echenique F, Wierman A (2016) The empirical implications of privacy-aware choice. Oper. Res. 64(1):67–78.Link, Google Scholar
• Dresher M (1962) A sampling inspection problem in arms control agreements: A game-theoretic analysis. Technical report, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.Google Scholar
• Dwork C, Roth A (2013) The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 9(3–4):211–407.Google Scholar
• Garnaev A (2000) Search Games and Other Applications of Game Theory, Vol. 485 (Springer, Berlin).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kaplan EH (2015) Socially efficient detection of terror plots. Oxford Econom. Papers 67(1):104–115.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pfleeger CP, Pfleeger SL (2002) Security in Computing (Prentice Hall Professional Technical Reference, Upper Saddle River, NJ).Google Scholar
• von Stengel B (2016) Recursive inspection games. Math. Oper. Res. 41(3):935–952.Link, Google Scholar