On the Inefficiency of Forward Markets in Leader–Follower Competition

References

• Allaz B, Vila J-L (1993) Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency. J. Econom. Theory 59(1):1–16.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson RW, Danthine J-P (1980) Hedging and joint production: Theory and illustrations. J. Finance 35(2):487–498.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Borenstein S, Bushnell J (1999) An empirical analysis of the potential for market power in California’s electricity industry. J. Indust. Econom. 47(3):285–323.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bushnell JB, Mansur ET, Saravia C (2008) Vertical arrangements, market structure, and competition: An analysis of restructured U.S. electricity markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(1):237–266.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai DWH, Wierman A (2013) Inefficiency in forward markets with supply friction. Proc. 52nd IEEE Conf. Decision Control (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ), 5594–5599.Google Scholar
• De Wolf D, Smeers Y (1997) A stochastic version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium model. Management Sci. 43(2):190–197.Link, Google Scholar
• DeMiguel V, Xu H (2009) A stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg model: Analysis, computation, and application. Oper. Res. 57(5):1220–1235.Link, Google Scholar
• Ehrenmann A (2004) Manifolds of multi-leader Cournot equilibria. Oper. Res. Lett. 32(2):121–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (2013) FERC, JP Morgan Unit agree to $410 million in penalties, disgorgement to ratepayers News release, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC. Accessed May 19, 2019, https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-30-13.asp#.XODdZi-p3OS.Google Scholar
• Gans JS, Price D, Woods K (1998) Contracts and electricity pool prices. Australian J. Management 23(1):83–96.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Green R (1999) The electricity contract market in England and Wales. J. Indust. Econom. 47(1):107–124.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Green RJ, Newbery DM (1992) Competition in the British electricity spot market. J. Political Econom. 100(5):929–953.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jing-Yuan W, Smeers Y (1999) Spatial oligopolistic electricity models with Cournot generators and regulated transmission prices. Oper. Res. 47(1):102–112.Link, Google Scholar
• Joskow P (2007) Competitive electricity markets and investments in new generating capacity. Dieter H, ed. The New Energy Paradigm (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK), 76–122.Google Scholar
• Joskow PL (2008) Lessons learned from electricity market liberalization. Energy J. 29(2):9–42.Google Scholar
• Kamat R, Oren SS (2004) Two-settlement systems for electricity markets under network uncertainty and market power. J. Regulatory Econom. 25(1):5–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kulkarni AA, Shanbhag UV (2012) Global equilibria of multi-leader multi-follower games. Working paper, University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign, Champaign. Google Scholar
• Le Coq C, Orzen H (2006) Do forward markets enhance competition? Experimental evidence. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 61(3):415–431.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Liski M, Montero J-P (2006) Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly. J. Econom. Theory 131(1):212–230.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meehan C (2011) General Electric introduces gas turbine designed for renewables. Accessed May 19, 2019, https://www.cleanenergyauthority.com/solar-energy-news/ge-introduces-gas-plant-for-solar-and-wind-power-060711.Google Scholar
• Murphy F, Smeers Y (2010) On the impact of forward markets on investments in oligopolistic markets with reference to electricity. Oper. Res. 58(3):515–528.Link, Google Scholar
• Newbery DM (1998) Competition, contracts, and entry in the electricity spot market. RAND J. Econom. 29(4):726–749.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nie P-y, Chen Y-h (2012) Duopoly competitions with capacity constrained input. Econom. Model. 29(5):1715–1721.Google Scholar
• Oren SS (2005) Generation adequacy via call options obligations: Safe passage to the promised land. Electr. J. 18(9):28–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pang J-S, Fukushima M (2005) Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games. Comput. Management Sci. 2(1):21–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roy AD (1952) Safety first and the holding of assets. Econometrica 20(3):431–449.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sherali HD (1984) A multiple leader Stackelberg model and analysis. Oper. Res. 32(2):390–404.Link, Google Scholar
• Sherali HD, Soyster AL, Murphy FH (1983) Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibria: Characterizations and computations. Oper. Res. 31(2):253–276.Link, Google Scholar
• Su C-L (2005) Equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints: Stationarities, algorithms, and applications. PhD dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
• Su C-L (2007) Analysis on the forward market equilibrium model. Oper. Res. Lett. 35(1):74–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Telser LG (1955) Safety first and hedging. Rev. Econom. Stud. 23(1):1–16.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Twomey P, Green R, Neuhoff K, Newbery D (2005) A review of the monitoring of market power: The possible roles of transmission system operators in monitoring for market power issues in congested transmission systems. J. Energy Literature 11(2):3–54.Google Scholar
• Wolak FA (2000) An empirical analysis of the impact of hedge contracts on bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market. Internat. Econom. J. 14(2):1–39.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wolfram CD (1999) Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(4):805–826.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wong P, Albrecht P, Allan R, Billinton R, Chen Q, Fong C, Haddad S, et al.. (1999) The IEEE reliability test system-1996. A report prepared by the reliability test system task force of the application of probability methods subcommittee. IEEE Trans. Power Systems 14(3):1010–1020.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Xu H (2005) An MPCC approach for stochastic Stackelberg–Nash–Cournot equilibrium. Optimization 54(1):27–57.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yamey BS (1951) An investigation of hedging on an organised produce exchange. Manchester School 19(3):305–319.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yao J, Oren SS, Adler I (2007) Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 181(3):1279–1296.Crossref, Google Scholar