Assignment Mechanisms Under Distributional Constraints

References

• Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2009) Strategy-proofness vs. efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(5):1954–1978.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akbarpour M, Nikzad A (2019) Approximate random allocation mechanisms. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I, Saberi A, Shameli A (2019) Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints. Proc. 30th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 229–240.Google Scholar
• Baswana S, Chakrabarti P, Chandran S, Kanoria Y, Patange U (2019) Centralized admissions for engineering colleges in India. INFORMS J. Appl. Analytics 49(5):338–354.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Biró P, Fleiner T, Irving RW, Manlove DF (2010) The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 411(34):3136–3153.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bogomolnaia A, Moulin H (2001) A new solution to the random assignment problem. J. Econom. Theory 100(2):295–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Braun S, Dwenger N, Kübler D, Westkamp A (2014) Implementing quotas in university admissions: An experimental analysis. Games Econom. Behav. 85:232–251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Budish E, Che YK, Kojima F, Milgrom P (2013) Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(2):585–623.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Kesten O (2017) Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis. J. Political Econom. 125(1):99–139.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Snmez T (2002) Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(5):1669–1686.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Delacrétaz D, Kominers SD, Teytelboym A (2016) Refugee resettlement. Working paper, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.Google Scholar
• Echenique F, Yenmez MB (2015) How to control controlled school choice? Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(8):2679–2694.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ehlers L, Hafalir IE, Yenmez MB, Yildirim MA (2014) School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds vs. soft bounds. J. Econom. Theory 153:648–683.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fleiner T, Kamiyama N (2012) A matroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas. Proc. 23rd Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 135–142.Google Scholar
• Fragiadakis D, Iwasaki A, Troyan P, Ueda S, Yokoo M (2016) Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 4(1):6:1–6:40.Google Scholar
• Fragiadakis D, Troyan P (2017) Improving matching under hard distributional constraints. Theoret. Econom. 12(2):863–908.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goto M, Kurata R, Hamada N, Iwasaki A, Yokoo M (2015) Improving fairness in nonwasteful matching with hierarchical regional minimum quotas. Proc. 2015 Internat. Conf. Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC), 1887–1888.Google Scholar
• Hafalir IE, Yenmez MB, Yildirim MA (2013) Effective affirmative action in school choice. Theoret. Econom. 8(2):325–363.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamada K, Iwama K, Miyazaki S (2016) The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas. Algorithmica 74(1):440–465.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huang CC (2010) Classified stable matching. Proc. 21st Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 1235–1253.Google Scholar
• Kamada Y, Kojima F (2014) Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(1):67–99.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamada Y, Kojima F (2017) Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints. J. Econom. Theory 168:107–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katta AK, Sethuraman J (2006) A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain. J. Econom. Theory 131(1):231–250.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kojima F (2012) School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. Games Econom. Behav. 75(2):685–693.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kominers SD, Sönmez T (2013) Designing for diversity in matching. Proc. 14th ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (ACM, New York), 603–604.Google Scholar
• Nguyen T, Vohra R (2017) Stable matching with proportionality constraints. Proc. 2017 ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 675–676.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nguyen T, Vohra R (2019) Near feasible stable matchings with complementarities. Amer. Econom. Rev. 108(11):3154–3169.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Noda S (2018) Large matchings in large markets with flexible supply. Working paper, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.Google Scholar
• Pathak PA, Sönmez T (2013) School admissions reform in Chicago and England: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(1):80–106.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schrijver A (2003) Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, vol. 24 (Springer Science & Business Media, New York).Google Scholar
• Sönmez T, Switzer TB (2013) Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States military academy. Econometrica 81(2):451–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Westkamp A (2013) An analysis of the German university admissions system. Econom. Theory 53(3):561–589.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yokoi Y (2016) A generalized polymatroid approach to stable matchings with lower quotas. Math. Oper. Res. 42(1):238–255.Link, Google Scholar