Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

References

• Aggarwal G, Badanidiyuru A, Mehta A (2019) Autobidding with constraints. Caragiannis I, Mirrokni V, Nikolova E, eds. Internat. Conf. Web Internet Econom. (Springer, Cham, Switzerland), 17–30.Google Scholar
• Aggarwal G, Goel A, Motwani R (2006) Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords. Proc. Seventh ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 1–7.Google Scholar
• Ausubel L, Baranov OV (2010) Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information. Working paper, University of Maryland, College Park.Google Scholar
• Ausubel L, Cramton P (1999) The optimality of being efficient. Working paper, University of Maryland, College Park.Google Scholar
• Ausubel L, Milgrom P (2002) Ascending auctions with package bidding. B.E. J. Theoret. Econom. 1(1):1–44.Google Scholar
• Ausubel L, Milgrom P (2006) The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction. Cramton P, Shoham Y, Steinberg R, eds. Combinatorial Auctions (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 22–26.Google Scholar
• Babaioff M, Kleinberg RD, Slivkins A (2015) Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation. J. ACM 62(2):1–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beck M, Ott M (2009) Revenue monotonicity in core-selecting package auctions. Working paper.Google Scholar
• Bosshard V, Bünz B, Lubin B, Seuken S (2017) Computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with continuous value and action spaces. Proc. 26th Internat. Joint Conf. Artificial Intelligence (International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence), 119–127.Google Scholar
• Bubeck S (2015) Convex optimization: Algorithms and complexity. Found. Trends Machine Learn. 8(3–4):231–357.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bünz B, Seuken S, Lubin B (2015) A faster core constraint generation algorithm for combinatorial auctions. Proc. 29th AAAI Conf. Artificial Intelligence (AAAI Press, Palo Alto, CA), 827–834.Google Scholar
• Bünz B, Lubin B, Seuken S (2018a) Designing core-selecting payment rules: A computational search approach. Preprint, submitted May 25, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178454.Google Scholar
• Bünz B, Lubin B, Seuken S (2018b) Designing core-selecting payment rules: A computational search approach. Proc. ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 109.Google Scholar
• Cavallo R, Krishnamurthy P, Sviridenko M, Wilkens CA (2017) Sponsored search auctions with rich ads. Proc. 26th Internat. Conf. World Wide Web (International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, Geneva), 43–51.Google Scholar
• Clarke EH (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11(1):17–33.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cramton P (2013) Spectrum auction design. Rev. Indust. Organ. 42(2):161–190.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Day R, Cramton P (2012) Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. 60(3):588–603.Link, Google Scholar
• Day R, Milgrom P (2008) Core-selecting package auctions. Internat. J. Game Theory 36(3–4):393–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Day R, Raghavan S (2007) Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions. Management Sci. 53(9):1389–1406.Link, Google Scholar
• Dobzinski S, Nisan N (2007) Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions. Proc. Eighth ACM Conf. Electronic Commerce (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 346–351.Google Scholar
• Edelman B, Ostrovsky M (2007) Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions. Decision Support Systems 43(1):192–198.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edelman B, Ostrovsky M, Schwarz M (2007) Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(1):242–259.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erdil A, Klemperer P (2010) A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 8(2–3):537–547.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goel G, Khani MR (2014) Revenue monotone mechanisms for online advertising. Proc. 23rd Internat. Conf. World Wide Web (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 723–734.Google Scholar
• Goel G, Khani MR, Leme RP (2015) Core-competitive auctions. Proc. 16th ACM Conf. Econom. Comput. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 149–166.Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Lien Y (2016) On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions. Theoret. Econom. 11(1):41–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gould N, Toint PL (2004) Preprocessing for quadratic programming. Math. Programming 100(1):95–132.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grötschel M, Lovász L, Schrijver A (1981) The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization. Combinatorica 1(2):169–197.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Groves T (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41(4):617–631.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lamy L (2010) Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity. Internat. J. Game Theory 39(3):503–510.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee YT, Sidford A, Wong SCW (2015) A faster cutting plane method and its implications for combinatorial and convex optimization. Proc. IEEE 56th Annual Sympos. Found. Comput. Sci. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, NJ), 1049–1065.Google Scholar
• Lubin B, Parkes DC (2009) Quantifying the strategyproofness of mechanisms via metrics on payoff distributions. Proc. 25th Conf. Uncertainty Artificial Intelligence (AUAI Press, Arlington, VA), 349–358.Google Scholar
• Lubin B, Býnz B, Seuken S (2015) New core-selecting payment rules with better fairness and incentive properties. Kominers SD, Xia L, eds. Proc. Third Conf. Auctions, Market Mechanisms Their Appl. (Association for Computing Machinery, New York).Google Scholar
• Mehrotra S (1992) On the implementation of a primal-dual interior point method. SIAM J. Optim. 2(4):575–601.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P (2007) Package auctions and exchanges. Econometrica 75(4):935–965.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nisan N, Ronen A (2007) Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. J. Artificial Intelligence Res. 29:19–47.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Osborne MJ, Rubinstein A (1994) A Course in Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Rastegari B, Condon A, Leyton-Brown K (2011) Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence 175(2):441–456.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sandholm T (2002) Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence 135(1–2):1–54.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sano R (2012) Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction. Games Econom. Behav. 74(2):637–650.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sayedi A (2018) Real-time bidding in online display advertising. Marketing Sci. 37(4):553–568.Link, Google Scholar
• Sinha P, Zoltners AA (1979) The multiple-choice knapsack problem. Oper. Res. 27(3):503–515.Link, Google Scholar
• Vaidya PM (1989) A new algorithm for minimizing convex functions over convex sets. Proc. 30th Annual Sympos. Found. Comput. Sci. (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, NJ), 338–343.Google Scholar
• Vaidya PM (1996) A new algorithm for minimizing convex functions over convex sets. Math. Programming 73(3):291–341.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16(1):8–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wilkens CA, Sivan B (2015) Single-call mechanisms. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 3(2):10.Google Scholar
• Wilkens CA, Cavallo R, Niazadeh R (2017) GSP: The Cinderella of mechanism design. Proc. 26th Internat. Conf. World Wide Web (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 25–32.Google Scholar
• Wilkens CA, Cavallo R, Niazadeh R, Taggart S (2016) Mechanism design for value maximizers. Preprint, submitted July 15, https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.04362.Google Scholar
• Xu H, Gao B, Yang D, Liu TY (2013) Predicting advertiser bidding behaviors in sponsored search by rationality modeling. Proc. 22nd Internat. Conf. World Wide Web (Association for Computing Machinery, New York), 1433–1444.Google Scholar
• Zhang Y (1998) Solving large-scale linear programs by interior-point methods under the Matlab environment. Optim. Methods Software 10(1):1–31.Crossref, Google Scholar