Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores

References

• Alizamir S, de Véricourt F, Wang S (2020) Warning against recurring risks: An information design approach. Management Sci. 66(10):4612–4629.Link, Google Scholar
• Alonso R, Camara O (2016) Persuading voters. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(11):3590–3605.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arieli I, Babichenko Y (2019) Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econom. Theory 182:185–217.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arieli I, Babichenko Y, Smorodinsky R, Takuro Y (2020) Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling. Preprint, submitted December 24, 2020, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511516.Google Scholar
• Ballester C, Calvó-Armengol A, Zenou Y (2006) Who’s who in networks. Wanted: The key player. Econometrica 74(5):1403–1417.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barabási A-L, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286(5439):509–512.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Batagelj V, Zavernik M (2002) Generalized cores. Preprint, submitted https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0202039.Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Morris S (2013) Robust predictions in games with incomplete information. Econometrica 81(4):1251–1308.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Morris S (2016) Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Econom. 11(2):487–522.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Morris S (2019) Information design: A unified perspective. J. Econom. Literature 57(1):44–95.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bloch F, Quérou N (2013) Pricing in social networks. Games Econom. Behav. 80:243–261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bollobás B (2001) Random Graphs (Cambridge University Press).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bubeck S (2015) Convex optimization: Algorithms and complexity. Foundations Trends Machine Learn. 8(3–4):231–357.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Candogan O (2019) Persuasion in networks: Public signals and k-cores. Proc. ACM Conf. on Econom. and Computation (ACM, New York), 133–134.Google Scholar
• Candogan O, Drakopoulos K (2020) Optimal signaling of content accuracy: Engagement vs. misinformation. Oper. Res. 68(2):309–654.Google Scholar
• Candogan O, Strack P (2021) Optimal disclosure of information to a privately informed receiver. Preprint, submitted January 25, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.10431.Google Scholar
• Candogan O, Bimpikis K, Ozdaglar A (2012) Optimal pricing in networks with externalities. Oper. Res. 60(4):883–905.Link, Google Scholar
• Drakopoulos K, Jain S, Randhawa RS (2021) Persuading customers to buy early: The value of personalized information provisioning. Management Sci. 67(2):661–1328.Google Scholar
• Dworczak P, Martini G (2019) The simple economics of optimal persuasion. J. Political Econom. 127(5):1993–2048.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Egorov G, Sonin K (2019) Persuasion on networks. Preprint, submitted June 3, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375521.Google Scholar
• Gagnon J, Goyal S (2017) Networks, markets, and inequality. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(1):1–30.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Kamenica E (2016) A Rothschild–Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(5):597–601.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gentzkow M, Kamenica E (2017) Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces. Games Econom. Behav. 104:411–429.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guo Y, Shmaya E (2019) The interval structure of optimal disclosure. Econometrica 87(2):653–675.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Janson S, Luczak MJ (2007) A simple solution to the k-core problem. Random Structures Algorithms 30(1–2):50–62.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Johari R, Light B, Weintraub G (2019) Quality selection in two-sided markets: A constrained price discrimination approach. Preprint, submitted https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.02251.Google Scholar
• Kamenica E (2019) Bayesian persuasion and information design. Annu. Rev. Econom. 11:249–272.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamenica E, Gentzkow M (2011) Bayesian persuasion. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(6):2590–2615.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kleiner A, Moldovanu B, Strack P (2021) Extreme points and majorization: Economic applications. Econometrica 89(4):1557–1593.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kolotilin A, Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A, Li M (2017) Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. Econometrica 85(6):1949–1964.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Küçükgül C, Özer Ö, Wang S (2021) Engineering social learning: Information design of time-locked sales campaigns for online platforms. Management Sci. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4151.Google Scholar
• Leskovec J, Krevl A (2014) SNAP datasets: Stanford large network data set collection. Accessed February 11, 2022, http://snap.stanford.edu/data.Google Scholar
• Lingenbrink D, Iyer K (2017) Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues with strategic customers. Proc. ACM Conf. on Econom. and Computation (ACM, New York), 347–347.Google Scholar
• Lingenbrink D, Iyer K (2018) Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals Preprint, submitted May 26, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3179262.Google Scholar
• Mahadev NVR, Peled UN (1995) Threshold Graphs and Related Topics, vol. 56 (Elsevier, New York).Google Scholar
• Molloy M, Reed B (1995) A critical point for random graphs with a given degree sequence. Random Structures Algorithms 6(2-3):161–180.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Newman MEJ (2002) Assortative mixing in networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 89(20):208701.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Onuchic P, Ray D (2021) Conveying value via categories. Preprint, submitted March 23, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12804.Google Scholar
• Papanastasiou Y, Bimpikis K, Savva N (2018) Crowdsourcing exploration. Management Sci. 64(4):1727–1746.Link, Google Scholar
• Topkis DM (2011) Supermodularity and Complementarity (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yang P, Iyer K, Frazier P (2019) Information design in spatial resource competition. Preprint, submitted September 27, 2019, https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.12723.Google Scholar