An Analysis of the Stability of Hinterland Container Transport Cooperation

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2021.1050

References

  • Agarwal R, Ergun Ö (2010) Network design and allocation mechanisms for carrier alliances in liner shipping. Oper. Res. 58(6):1726–1742.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Ahuja RK, Magnanti TL, Orlin JB (1993) Network Flows (Prentice Hall, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Basso F, D’Amours S, Rönnqvist M, Weintraub A (2019) A survey on obstacles and difficulties of practical implementation of horizontal collaboration in logistics. Internat. Trans. Oper. Res. 26(3):775–793.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Carstensen PJ (1983) Complexity of some parametric integer and network programming problems. Math. Programming 26(1):64–75.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cruijssen F, Dullaert W, Fleuren H (2007) Horizontal cooperation in transport and logistics: a literature review. Transportation J. 46(3):22–39.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cruijssen F, Borm P, Fleuren H, Hamers H (2010) Supplier-initiated outsourcing: a methodology to exploit synergy in transportation. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 207(2):763–774.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • de Langen PP (2004) The Performance of Seaport Clusters; A Framework to Analyze Cluster Performance and an Application to the Seaport Clusters of Durban, Rotterdam and the Lower Mississippi (Erasmus Research Institute of Management, Rotterdam, the Netherlands).Google Scholar
  • Eisner MJ, Severance DG (1976) Mathematical techniques for efficient record segmentation in large shared databases. J. ACM 23(4):619–635.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Engevall S, Göthe-Lundgren M, Värbrand P (2004) The heterogeneous vehicle-routing game. Transportation Sci. 38(1):71–85.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Frisk M, Göthe-Lundgren M, Jörnsten K, Rönnqvist M (2010) Cost allocation in collaborative forest transportation. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 205(2):448–458.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gal T (2010) Postoptimal Analyses, Parametric Programming, and Related Topics: Degeneracy, Multicriteria Decision Making, Redundancy (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin).Google Scholar
  • Gillies DB (1959) Solutions to general non-zero-sum games. Contribut. Theory Games 4(40):47–85.Google Scholar
  • Guajardo M, Rönnqvist M (2016) A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation. Internat. Trans. Oper. Res. 23(3):371–392.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gul F (1989) Bargaining foundations of Shapley value. Econometrica 75(1):81–95.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Houghtalen L, Ergun Ö, Sokol J (2011) Designing mechanisms for the management of carrier alliances. Transportation Sci. 45(4):465–482.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Jenkins L (1990) Parametric methods in integer linear programming. Ann. Oper. Res. 27(1):77–96.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Karsten F, Slikker M, van Houtum GJ (2015) Resource pooling and cost allocation among independent service providers. Oper. Res. 63(2):476–488.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lozano S, Moreno P, Adenso-Díaz B, Algaba E (2013) Cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 229(2):444–452.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nash J (1953) Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica 21(1):128.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Notteboom TE (2004) A carrier’s perspective on container network configuration at sea and on land. J. Internat. Logist. Trade 1(2):65–87.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Notteboom TE, Rodrigue JP (2005) Port regionalization: toward a new phase in port development. Marit. Policy Management 32(3):297–313.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Notteboom T, Rodrigue JP (2007) Re-Assessing Port-Hinterland Relationships in the Context of Global Commodity Chains. Inserting Port-Cities in Global Supply Chains (Ashgate, London).Google Scholar
  • Özener OÖ, Ergun Ö, Savelsbergh M (2013) Allocating cost of service to customers in inventory routing. Oper. Res. 61(1):112–125.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Park SH, Ungson GR (2003) Interfirm rivalry and managerial complexity: a conceptual framework of alliance failure. Organ. Sci. 12(1):37–53.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Pérez-Castrillo D, Wettstein D (2001) Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value. J. Econom. Theory 100(2):274–294.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Port of Rotterdam (2018) Interim overview of inland container shipping sector consultations. Accessed September 17, 2018, https://www.portofrotterdam.com/.Google Scholar
  • Serrano R (2004) Fifty years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003 (December 2004). Brown University Economics Working Paper No. 2004-20. Preprint, submitted May 18, 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.724233.Google Scholar
  • Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. Contribut. Theory Games 2(28):307–317.Google Scholar
  • Shapley LS (1971) Cores of convex games. Internat. J. Game Theory 1(1):11–26.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shapley LS, Shubik M (1966) Quasi-Cores in a monetary economy with nonconvex preferences. Econometrica 34(4):805–827.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Veenstra A, Zuidwijk R, Van Asperen E (2012) The extended gate concept for container terminals: expanding the notion of dry ports. Marit. Econom. Logist. 14(1):14–32.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Wilmsmeier G, Monios J, Lambert B (2011) The directional development of intermodal freight corridors in relation to inland terminals. J. Transportation Geogr. 19(6):1379–1386.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ypsilantis P, Zuidwijk R (2019) Collaborative fleet deployment and routing for sustainable transport. Sustainability 11(20):5666.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zheng J, Gao Z, Yang D, Sun Z (2015) Network design and capacity exchange for liner alliances with fixed and variable container demands. Transportation Sci. 49(4):886–899.LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.