A Theory of Reconnaissance: II

In Part I of this two-part paper, the author considered the one-sided reconnaissance problem, in which the reconnoiterer seeks to maximize the information (minimize the confusion) obtained as a result of the expenditure of a given effort, it being assumed that the side being reconnoitered remains passive. This problem was formulated as a problem in information theory. This part concerns the two-sided reconnaissance problem, in which the side being reconnoitered seeks to minimize the information (maximize the confusion) obtained by the reconnoiterer, while maintaining at least a certain minimum acceptable threat with a fixed budget. This problem, formulated as a zero-sum, two-person game, is solved for one special case (fixed equipment) and it is proved that there exists a solution in mixed strategies for the general case. A model is given for evaluating the effectiveness of a photo-interpreter by separating the confusion caused by the photointerpreter from that caused by the photographs.