Multiagent Online Learning in Dynamic and Uncertain Environments

Ceyhun Eksin
Ceyhun Eksin
[email protected]
College of Engineering, Texas A& M University, College Station, Texas 77843
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,
Jeff S. Shamma
Corresponding Author
Jeff S. Shamma
[email protected]
Grainger College of Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801
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,
Behrouz Touri
Behrouz Touri
[email protected]
Grainger College of Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801
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Ceyhun Eksin

[email protected]

College of Engineering, Texas A& M University, College Station, Texas 77843

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Jeff S. Shamma

Corresponding Author

Jeff S. Shamma

[email protected]

Grainger College of Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801

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Behrouz Touri

[email protected]

Grainger College of Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801

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Published Online:1 Nov 2026https://doi.org/10.1287/educ.2026.0302

Endnotes

¹ Another branch of game theory, not considered herein, is cooperative games (e.g., Peleg and Sudhölter [67]).

² There are $a_{j}, a_{j}^{'} \in A_{j}$ such that $g_{i j} (\cdot, a_{j}) \neq g_{i j} (\cdot, a_{j}^{'})$ .

³ See also the recent discussion on “preference graphs” in Biggar and Shames [12].

⁴ Weakly acyclic games also can be characterized by a potential-like function (see the supplemental appendix, Section A.2).

⁵ The stage index t may arise from a common clock, in which case all players act or a predefined or a random subset of players act at stage t, or from independent Poisson clocks, one per player, in which case t indexes the tth event across all clocks.

⁶ In Marden et al. [57], this revision mechanism is called JSFP with inertia.

⁷ Because there is only a single population, we do not use a subscript to specify the population index.

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Ceyhun Eksin, Jeff S. Shamma, Behrouz Touri (2026) Multiagent Online Learning in Dynamic and Uncertain Environments. INFORMS TutORials in Operations Research null(null):307-347.

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