Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?

References

• Anwar S., McMillan R., Zheng M. Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay. Eur. Econom. Rev. (2006) 50(2):307–322Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bell D. Regret in decision making under uncertainty. Oper. Res. (1982) 30(5):961–981Link, Google Scholar
• Binswanger H. P. Attitude toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural India. Amer. J. Agricultural Econom. (1980) 62(3):395–407Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C., Ho T.-H. Violations of the betweenness axiom and nonlinearity in probability. J. Risk Uncertainty (1994) 8(2):167–196Crossref, Google Scholar
• Campo S., Guerre E., Perrigne I., Vuong Q. Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk averse bidders. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2011) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Chen K.-Y., Plott C. R. Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first-price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. (1998) 25(1):34–78Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y., Katuscak P., Ozdenoren E. Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: An experimental study. (2005) . Working paper, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education–Economics Institute, Prague, Czech RepublicGoogle Scholar
• Cox J. C., Oaxaca R. L. Is bidding behavior consistent with bidding theory for private value auctions? Res. Experiment. Econom. (1996) 6:131–148Google Scholar
• Crawford V., Kugler T., Neeman Z., Pauzner A. Behaviorally optimal auction design: Examples and observations. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. (2009) 7(2–3):377–387Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R. The effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions. Management Sci. (1989) 35(6):685–692Link, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Katok E. Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Management Sci. (2008) 54(4):808–819Link, Google Scholar
• Filiz-Ozbay E., Ozbay E. Y. Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2007) 97(4):1407–1418Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. (2007) 10(2):171–178Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree J. K., Holt C. A. A model of noisy introspection. Games Econom. Behav. (2004) 46(2):365–382Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree J. K., Holt C. A., Palfrey T. R. Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions. J. Econom. Theory (2002) 104(1):247–272Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greenleaf E. Reserves, regret, and rejoicing in open English auctions. J. Consumer Res. (2004) 31(2):264–273Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hausman J. A. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica (1978) 46(6):1251–1271Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holt C. A., Laury S. K. Risk aversion and incentive effects. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2002) 92(5):1644–1655Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Kagel J. H., Roth A. E. A survey of experimental research. Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) 501–585Google Scholar
• Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica (1979) 47(2):263–291Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katkar R., Reiley D. H. Public versus secret reserve prices in eBay auctions: Results from a Pokemon field experiment. (2005) . Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CAGoogle Scholar
• Krishna V.Auction Theory (2002) 1st ed.(Academic Press, San Diego) Google Scholar
• Levin D., Smith J. L. Optimal reservation prices in auctions. Econom. J. (1996) 106(438):1271–1283Google Scholar
• McAfee R. P. Mechanism design by competing sellers. Econometrica (1993) 61(6):1281–1312Crossref, Google Scholar
• Myerson R. Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. (1981) 6(1):58–73Link, Google Scholar
• Prelec D. The probability weighting function. Econometrica (1998) 66(3):497–527Crossref, Google Scholar
• Riley J. G., Samuelson W. F. Optimal auctions. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1981) 71(3):381–392Google Scholar
• Tversky A., Kahneman D. Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty. J. Risk Uncertainty (1992) 5:297–323Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vuong Q. H. Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses. Econometrica (1989) 57(2):307–333Crossref, Google Scholar
• Waehrer K., Harstad R. M., Rothkopf M. H. Auction form preferences of risk-averse bid takers. RAND J. Econom. (1998) 29(1):179–192Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wu G., Gonzalez R. Curvature of the probability weighting function. Management Sci. (1996) 42(12):1676–1690Link, Google Scholar