The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment

References

• Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012) Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2015 global fraud study. Last accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.acfe.com/uploadedFiles/ACFE_Website/Content/rttn/2012-report-to-nations.pdf.Google Scholar
• Basu K, Weibull JW (2003) Punctuality: A cultural trait as equilibrium. Arnott R, Greenwald B, Kanbur R, Nalebuff B, eds. Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz (MIT Press, London), 163–182.Google Scholar
• Belot M, Schröder M (2013) Sloppy work, lies and theft: A novel experimental design to study counterproductive behavior. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93:233–238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bénabou R, Tirole J (2003) Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 70:489–520.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Boly A (2011) On the incentive effects of monitoring: Evidence from the lab and the field. Experiment. Econom. 14(2):241–253.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dickinson D, Villeval M-C (2008) Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementary between agency and crowding-out theories. Games Econom. Behav. 63(1):56–76.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004) A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 47(2):268–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Kosfeld M (2006) The hidden costs of control. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(5):1611–1630.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fisman R, Miguel E (2007) Corruption, norms, and legal enforcement: Evidence from diplomatic parking tickets. J. Political Econom. 115(6):1020–1048.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Frey BS (1993) Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry with trust and loyalty. Econom. Inquiry 31(4):663–670.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Frey BS, Jegen R (2001) Motivational interactions: Effects on behavior. Ann. Econom. Statist. 63/64:131–153.Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Meier S, Rey-Biel P (2011) When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify behavior. J. Econom. Perspect. 25(4):191–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000a) A fine is a price. J. Legal Stud. 29(1):1–18.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000b) Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quart. J. Econoimcs 115(3):791–810.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2004) An online recruitment system for economic experiments. Kremer K, Macho V, eds. Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003 (GWDG Bericht 63, Göttingen), 73–93.Google Scholar
• Gubler T, Larkin I, Pierce L (2014) Motivational spillovers from awards: Crowding out in a multitasking environment. HBS Working Paper 13-069, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Krupka EL, Weber RA (2013) Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(3):495–524.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kwintessential. Doing business in Germany. Accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/etiquette/doing-business-germany.html.Google Scholar
• Nagin DS, Rebitzer JB, Sanders S, Taylor LJ (2002) Monitoring, motivation, and management: The determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(2):850–873.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(5):1281–302.Google Scholar
• Robinson SL, Bennett RJ (1995) A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study. Acad. Management J. 38(2):555–572.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sliwka D (2007) Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(3):999–1012.Crossref, Google Scholar
• The Local: Germany’s news in English. Ten tips for German business etiquette. Accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.thelocal.de/galleries/news/1773.Google Scholar
• University of Frankfurt (International Office) (2013) Guide to German culture, customs and etiquette. Accessed February 25, 2014, http://www2.uni-frankfurt.de/46329991/Guide-to-German-culture_and-etiquette.pdf.Google Scholar