Reputation and Regulations: Evidence from eBay

References

• Akerlof GA (1970) The market for ˝lemons˝: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quart. J. Econom. 84(3):488–500.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson M, Magruder J (2011) Learning from the crowd: Regression discontinuity estimates of the effects of an online review database. Econom. J. 122(563): 957–989.Google Scholar
• Cabral L, Hortaçsu A (2010) The dynamics of seller reputation: Evidence from eBay. J. Indust. Econom. 58(1):54–78.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cai H, Jin GZ, Liu C, Zhou L-A (2013) More trusting, less trust? an investigation of early e-commerce in China. NBER Working Paper 18961, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edelman BG, Luca M (2014) Digital discrimination: The case of airbnb.com. HBS NOM Unit Working Paper 14-054, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Einav L, Kuchler T, Levin JD, Sundaresan N (2015) Assessing sale strategies in online markets using matched listings. Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconomics 7(2):215–247.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Elfenbein DW, Fisman R, McManus B (2016) Market structure, reputation, and the value of quality certification. Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconomics. 7(4):83–108.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fan Y, Ju J, Xiao M (2013) Losing to win: Reputation management of online sellers. Working paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Google Scholar
• Glosten LR, Milgrom PR (1985) Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders. J. Financial Econom. 14(1):71–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1999) Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66(1):169–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luca M (2011) Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp.com. HBS Working Paper 12-016, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Mayzlin D, Dover Y, Chevalier JA (2012) Promotional reviews: An empirical investigation of online review manipulation. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J. Financial Econom. 13(2):187–221.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nosko C, Tadelis S (2015) The limits of reputation in platform markets: An empirical analysis and field experiment. Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Pauly MV (1974) Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: The roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quart. J. Econom. 88(1):44–62.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roberts JW (2011) Can warranties substitute for reputations? Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconomics 3(3):69–85.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rothschild M, Stiglitz J (1992) Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (Springer, Netherlands), 355–375.Google Scholar
• Saeedi M (2014) Reputation and adverse selection, theory and evidence from eBay. Working paper, The Ohio State University, Columbus.Google Scholar
• Shapiro C (1983) Premiums for high quality products as returns to reputations. Quart. J. Econom. 98(4):659–680.Crossref, Google Scholar