Contract Design by Service Providers with Private Effort

References

• Akan M, Ata B, Lariviere M (2011) Asymmetric information and economies of scale in service contracting. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 13(1):58–72.Link, Google Scholar
• Anderson ET, Dana JD (2009) When is price discrimination profitable? Management Sci. 55(6):980–989.Link, Google Scholar
• Ausubel LM, Cramton P, Deneckere RJ (2002) Bargaining with incomplete information. Aumann RJ, Hart S, eds. Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 3 (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam), 1897–1945.Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Dewatripont M (2005) Contract Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Cachon GP, Zhang F (2006) Procurement fast delivery: Sole outsourcing with information asymmetry. Management Sci. 52(6):881–896.Link, Google Scholar
• Chen F (2005) Salesforce incentives, market information, and production/inventory planning. Management Sci. 51(1):60–75.Link, Google Scholar
• Debo L, Toktay LB, Wassenhove LNV (2008) Queuing for expert services. Management Sci. 54(8):1497–1512.Link, Google Scholar
• Dudek MK, Kim T, Ledyard JO (1995) First best Bayesian privatization mechanisms. Social Science Working Paper 896, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena.Google Scholar
• Dulleck U, Kerschbamer R (2006) On doctors, mechanics, and computer specialists: The economics of credence goods. J. Econom. Literature 44(1):5–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Economist, The (2014) Charging more, getting less: Lawyers’ biggest customers are discovering that they can haggle. (January 18), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21594317-lawyers-biggest-customers-are-discovering-they-can-haggle-charging-more-getting-less.Google Scholar
• Emons W (1997) Credence goods and fraudulent experts. RAND J. Econom. 28(1):107–119.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fong Y (2005) When do experts cheat and whom do they target? RAND J. Econom. 36(1):113–130.Google Scholar
• Galavotti S, Muto N, Oyama D (2011) On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality. Econom. Theory 48(1):87–123.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gresik TA (1991) Ex ante efficient, ex post individual rational trade. J. Econom. Theory 53(1):131–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman S, Hart O (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econom. 94(4):691–719.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O, Moore J (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Political Econom. 98(6):1119–1158.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jullien B (2000) Participation constraints in adverse selection models. J. Econom. Theory 93(1):1–47.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karmarkar U (2015) The service and information economy: Research opportunities. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 17(2):136–141.Link, Google Scholar
• Kaya M, Özer Ö (2009) Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information. Naval Res. Logist. 56(7):669–685.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim S, Cohen MA, Netessine S (2007) Performance contracting in after-sales service supply chains. Management Sci. 53(12):1843–1858.Link, Google Scholar
• Kiser R (2010) Beyond Right and Wrong: The Power of Effective Decision Making for Attorneys and Clients (Springer, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Martimort D (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Tirole J (1986) Using cost observation to regulate firms. J. Political Econom. 94(3, Part 1):614–641.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Maskin E, Rochet J-C (1987) Optimal nonlinear pricing with two-dimensional characteristics. Groves T, Radner R, Reiter S, eds. Information Incentives, and Economics Mechanisms: Essays in Honor of Leonid Hurwicz (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis), 256–266.Google Scholar
• Liu T (2011) Credence goods market with conscientious and selfish experts. Internat. Econom. Rev. 52:227–244.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Løwendahl B (2005) Strategic Management of Professional Service Firms (Copenhagen Business School Press, Copenhagen, Denmark).Google Scholar
• Luca M (2011) Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp.com. HBS Working Paper 12-016, Harvard Business School, Boston.Google Scholar
• Mirrlees JA (1999) The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour: Part I. Rev. Econom. Stud. 66:3–21.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Moorthy KS (1984) Market segmentation, self-selection, and product line design. Marketing Sci. 3(4):288–307.Link, Google Scholar
• Müller HM (1997) The Mirrlees-problem revisited. Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publication 97-43, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany.Google Scholar
• Myerson R (1979) Incentive-compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47(1):61–73.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Picard P (1987) On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection. J. Public Econom. 33(3):305–331.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ren ZJ, Zhang F (2009) Service outsourcing: Capacity, quality and correlated costs. Working paper, Boston University, Boston.Google Scholar
• Robertson MA, Calloway JA (2008) Winning Alternative to the Billable Hour: Strategies That Work, 3rd ed. (American Bar Association, Chicago).Google Scholar
• Rochet J-C, Stole LA (2003) The economics of multidimensional screening. Kreps DM, Wallis KF, eds. Adv. Econom. Econometrics: Theory Appl., Eighth World Congress, Vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK), 150–198.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roels G, Karmarkar US, Carr S (2010) Contracting for collaborative services. Management Sci. 56(5):849–863.Link, Google Scholar
• Ross W (2006) The Honest Hour: The Ethics of Time-Based Billing by Attorneys (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC).Google Scholar
• Sage Technology Group (2015) Our pricing structure. Accessed March 1, http://www.sagetechgroup.com/pricing.aspx.Google Scholar
• Shepherd J (2011) Small firms, big lawyers: The real reason for timesheets. Above the Law (June 15), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/06/small-firms-big-lawyers-the-real-reason-for-timesheets.Google Scholar
• Sultana M, Rahman A, Chowdhury S (2013) A review of performance based maintenance of road infrastructure by contracting. Internat. J. Productivity Performance Management 62(3):276–292.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sundararajan A (2004) Nonlinear pricing of information goods. Management Sci. 50(12):1660–1673.Link, Google Scholar
• Whinston MD (1983) Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance. J. Public Econom. 22(1):49–71.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zajac A, Van Voris B (2013) Apple objects to monitor’s fees in e-books antitrust case. Bloomberg (November 29), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-30/apple-objects-to-monitor-s-fees-in-e-books-antitrust-case.html.Google Scholar
• Zhang H, Zenios S (2008) A dynamic principal-agent model with hidden information: Sequential optimality through truthful state revelation. Oper. Res. 56(3):681–696.Link, Google Scholar