Trust in Procurement Interactions

References

• Bajari P, Houghton S, Tadelis S (2014) Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of adaptation costs. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(4):1288–1319.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bajari P, McMillan R, Tadelis S (2009) Auctions versus negotiations in procurement: An empirical analysis. J. Law Econom. Organ. 25(2):372–399.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beall S, Carter CR, Carter PL, Germer T, Hendrick TE, Jap SD, Kaufmann L, Maciejewski D, Monczka R, Petersen KJ (2003) The role of reverse auctions in strategic sourcing. Focus study, CAPS Research, Tempe, AZ.Google Scholar
• Blanco M, Engelmann D, Normann HT (2011) A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. Games Econom. Behav. 72(2):321–338.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(1):166–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brosig-Koch J, Heinrich T (2012) Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. Production Oper. Management 23(2):210–220.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J, Klemperer P (1996) Auctions versus negotiations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(1):180–194.Google Scholar
• Carter CR, Kaufmann L, Beall S, Carter PL, Hendrick TE, Petersen KJ (2004) Reverse auctions—Grounded theory from the buyer and supplier perspective. Transportation Res. Part E: Logistics Transportation Rev. 40(3):229–254.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cui TH, Mallucci P (2016) Fairness ideals in distribution channels. J. Marketing Res. 53(6):969–987.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cui TH, Raju JS, Zhang ZJ (2007) Fairness and channel coordination. Management Sci. 53(8):1303–1314.Link, Google Scholar
• Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004) A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 47(2):268–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Elmaghraby WJ (2007) Auctions within e-sourcing events. Production Oper. Management 16(4):409–422.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Emiliani ML, Stec DJ (2005) Commentary on “Reverse auctions for relationship marketers” by Daly and Nath. Indust. Marketing Management 34(2):167–171.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R, Haruvy E, Katok E (2007) A comparison of buyer-determined and price-based multiattribute mechanisms. Marketing Sci. 26(5):629–641.Link, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (2006) The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism—Experimental evidence and new theories. Kolm S-J, Ythier JM, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, vol. 1 (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 615–691.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Kirchsteiger G, Riedl A (1993) Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quart. J. Econom. 108(2):437–459.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fugger N, Katok E, Wambach A (2016) Collusion in dynamic buyer-determined reverse auctions. Management Sci. 62(2):518–533.Link, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 1(1):114–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O, Moore J (2008) Contracts as reference points. Quart. J. Econom. 123(1):1–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haruvy E, Katok E (2013) Increasing revenue by decreasing information in procurement auctions. Production Oper. Management 22(1):19–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kallstrom H (2015) Why growth shifted in the global automotive industry. Market Realist (February 5), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-growth-shifted-global-automotive-193845776.html.Google Scholar
• Kim S-H, Netessine S (2013) Collaborative cost reduction and component procurement under information asymmetry. Management Sci. 59(1):189–206.Link, Google Scholar
• Liker J, Choi TY (2004) Building deep supplier relationships. Harvard Bus. Rev. (December):1–22.Google Scholar
• Mayer RC, Davis JH, Schoorman FD (1995) An integrative model of organizational trust. Acad. Management Rev. 20(3):709–734.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econom. Behav. 10(1):6–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1998) Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Experiment. Econom. 1(1):9–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Zheng Y (2018) Trust and trustworthiness. Donohue K, Katok E, Leider S, eds. Handbook of Behavioral Operations (John Wiley & Sons, New York), 489–524.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Subramanian U, Wang Y (2018) Information sharing, advice provision, or delegation: What leads to higher trust and trustworthiness? Management Sci. 64(1):474–493.Link, Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Zheng Y, Chen K-Y (2011) Trust in forecast information sharing. Management Sci. 57(6):1111–1137.Link, Google Scholar
• Özer Ö, Zheng Y, Ren Y (2014) Trust, trustworthiness, and information sharing in supply chains bridging China and the United States. Management Sci. 60(10):2435–2460.Link, Google Scholar
• Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Amer. Econom. Rev. 83(5):1281–1302.Google Scholar
• Shugan M (2005) Marketing and designing transaction games. Marketing Sci. 24(4):525–530.Link, Google Scholar
• Smith G (2016) VW’s battle with contractors gets unusually messy. Fortune (August 22), http://fortune.com/2016/08/22/vw-supplier-dispute-production/.Google Scholar
• Stallkamp TT (2005) Score! A Better Way to Do Business: Moving from Conflict to Collaboration (Wharton School Publishing, Upper Saddle River, NJ).Google Scholar
• Verespej M (2004) E-procurement explosion. IndustryWeek (December 21), https://www.industryweek.com/planning-amp-forecasting/e-procurement-explosion.Google Scholar
• Williamson OE (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Simon & Schuster, New York).Google Scholar
• Yang Y, Onderstal S, Schram A (2016) Inequity aversion revisited. J. Econom. Psych. 54(June):1–16.Google Scholar