Exploration in Teams and the Encouragement Effect: Theory and Experimental Evidence

References

• Admati AR, Perry M (1991) Joint projects without commitment. Rev. Econom. Stud. 58(2):259–276.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and real authority in organizations. J. Political Econom. 105(1):1–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Amabile TM, Hennessey BA, Grossman BS (1986) Social influences on creativity: The effects of contracted-for reward. J. Personality Soc. Psych. 50(1):14–23.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson SP, Goeree JK, Holt CA (1998) A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. J. Public Econom. 70(2):297–323.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Andersson O, Huysentruyt M, Miettinen T, Stephan U (2016) Person–organization fit and incentives: A causal test. Management Sci. 63(1):73–96.Google Scholar
• Angrist JD, Pischke J-S (2009) Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baldwin C, Von Hippel E (2011) Modeling a paradigm shift: From producer innovation to user and open collaborative innovation. Organ. Sci. 22(6):1399–1417.Link, Google Scholar
• Becker GS (1974) A theory of social interactions. J. Political Econom. 82(6):1063–1093.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berg J, Dickhaut J, McCabe K (1995) Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games Econom. Behav. 10(1):122–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Björk L, Kocher M, Martinsson P, Nam Khanh P (2016) Cooperation under risk and ambiguity. Technical report, Gothenburg University, Sweden.Google Scholar
• Bolino MC, Grant AM (2016) The bright side of being prosocial at work, and the dark side, too: A review and agenda for research on other-oriented motives, behavior, and impact in organizations. Acad. Management Ann. 10(1):599–670.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton P, Harris C (1999) Strategic experimentation. Econometrica 67(2):349–374.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonatti A, Hörner J (2011) Collaborating. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(2):632–663.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Boudreau KJ, Lakhani KR (2016) Innovation experiments: Researching technical advance, knowledge production, and the design of supporting institutions. Innovation Policy Econom. 16(1):135–167.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown M, Flinn CJ, Schotter A (2011) Real-time search in the laboratory and the market. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(2):948–974.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brüggemann J, Bizer K (2016) Laboratory experiments in innovation research: A methodological overview and a review of the current literature. J. Innovation Entrepreneurship 5(1):1–13.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
• Camerer CF, Ho T-H, Chong JK (2004) Behavioural game theory: Thinking, learning and teaching. Huck S, ed. Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour (Palgrave Macmillan, London), 120–180.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cappelen AW, Reme B-A, Sørensen EØ, Tungodden B (2015) Leadership and incentives. Management Sci. 62(7):1944–1953.Link, Google Scholar
• Charness G, Rabin M (2002) Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quart. J. Econom. 117(3):817–869.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clark K, Sefton M (2001) The sequential prisoner’s dilemma: Evidence on reciprocation. Econom. J. 111(468):51–68.Google Scholar
• Cohen J (1992) A power primer. Psych. Bull. 112(1):155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Compte O, Jehiel P (2003) Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents. J. Econom. Theory 112(2):334–342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Compte O, Jehiel P (2004) Gradualism in bargaining and contribution games. Rev. Econom. Stud. 71(4):975–1000.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cox JC, Friedman D, Gjerstad S (2007) A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness. Games Econom. Behav. 59(1):17–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crawford VP, Costa-Gomes MA, Iriberri N (2013) Structural models of nonequilibrium strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications. J. Econom. Literature 51(1):5–62.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deck CA, Kimbrough EO (2019) Experimenting with contests for experimentation. Southern Econom. J. 84(2):391–406.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dickinson DL (1998) The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 35(4):517–533.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dohmen T, Falk A, Huffman D, Sunde U, Schupp J, Wagner GG (2011) Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 9(3):522–550.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dufwenberg M, Kirchsteiger G (2004) A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 47(2):268–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ederer F, Manso G (2013) Is pay for performance detrimental to innovation? Management Sci. 59(7):1496–1513.Link, Google Scholar
• Ellingsen T, Johannesson M (2008) Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(3):990–1008.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erat S, Gneezy U (2016) Incentives for creativity. Experiment. Econom. 19(2):269–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Erev I, Haruvy E (2013) Learning and the economics of small decisions. Kagel JH, Roth AE, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 638–699.Google Scholar
• Falk A, Fischbacher U (2006) A theory of reciprocity. Games Econom. Behav. 54(2):293–315.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) On the nature of fair behavior. Econom. Inquiry 41(1):20–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2008) Testing theories of fairness—intentions matter. Games Econom. Behav. 62(1):287–303.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fershtman C, Rubinstein A (1997) A simple model of equilibrium in search procedures. J. Econom. Theory 72(2):432–441.Google Scholar
• Frederick S (2005) Cognitive reflection and decision making. J. Econom. Perspect. 19(4):25–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gelman A, Carlin J (2014) Beyond power calculations: Assessing types (sign) and type m (magnitude) errors. Perspect. Psych. Sci. 9(6):641–651.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gilboa I, Postlewaite A, Samuelson L, Schmeidler D (2014) Economic models as analogies. Econom. J. 124(578):F513–F533.Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Potters J (1997) An experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods. Quart. J. Econom. 112(2):631–645.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA (1999) Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 96(19):10564–10567.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA (2000) Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games. Eur. Econom. Rev. 44(4):1079–1089.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA (2001) Ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions. Amer. Econom. Rev. 91(5):1402–1422.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR (2010) Quantal response equilibria. Durlauf SN, Blume LE, eds. Behavioural and Experimental Economics (Palgrave Macmillan UK, London), 234–242.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 1:114–125.Google Scholar
• Grüne-Yanoff T (2007) Bounded rationality. Philos. Compass 2(3):534–563.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Güth W, Levati MV, Sutter M, Van Der Heijden E (2007) Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments. J. Public Econom. 91(5):1023–1042.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Halac M, Kartik N, Liu Q (2016) Optimal contracts for experimentation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 83(3):1040–1091.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harhoff D, Lakhani KR (2016) Revolutionizing Innovation: Users, Communities, and Open Innovation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hollensbe E, Wookey C, Hickey L, George G, Nichols CV (2014) Organizations with purpose. Acad. Management J. 57(5):1227–1234.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hörner J, Skrzypacz A (2017) Learning, experimentation, and information design. Adv. Econom. Econometrics 1:63-98.Google Scholar
• Ioannidis JP (2005) Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Medicine 2(8):e124.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klor EF, Kube S, Winter E, Zultan R (2014) Can higher rewards lead to less effort? incentive reversal in teams. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 97:72–83.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kosse F, Deckers T, Pinger PR, Schildberg-Hörisch H, Armin F (2018) The formation of prosociality: Causal evidence on the role of social environment. Working Paper No. 7068, CESifo, Munich, Germany.Google Scholar
• Levati MV, Morone A (2013) Voluntary contributions with risky and uncertain marginal returns: The importance of the parameter values. J. Public Econom. Theory 15(5):736–744.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levati MV, Sutter M, Van der Heijden E (2007) Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information. J. Conflict Resolution 51(5):793–818.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levitt SD, List JA (2011) Was there really a Hawthorne effect at the hawthorne plant? an analysis of the original illumination experiments. Amer. Econom. J. Appl. Econom. 3(1):224–238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lindbeck A, Weibull JW (1988) Altruism and time consistency: The economics of fait accompli. J. Political Econom. 96(6):1165–1182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• List J, Sadoff S, Wagner M (2011) So you want to run an experiment, now what? an introduction to optimal sample arrangements. Experiment. Econom. 14:439–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• List JA, Shaikh AM, Xu Y (2016) Multiple hypothesis testing in experimental economics. NBER Working Paper No. 21875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Mäki U (2005) Models are experiments, experiments are models. J. Econom. Methodology 12(2):303–315.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maniadis Z, Tufano F, List JA (2014) One swallow doesn’t make a summer: New evidence on anchoring effects. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(1):277–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• March JG (1991) Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organ. Sci. 2(1):71–87.Link, Google Scholar
• McBride M (2006) Discrete public goods under threshold uncertainty. J. Public Econom. 90(6):1181–1199.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCall JJ (1970) Economics of information and job search. Quart. J. Econom. 84(1):113–126.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1998) Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games. Experiment. Econom. 1(1):9–41.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miettinen T, Kosfeld M, Fehr E, Weibull JW (2018) Revealed preferences in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma: A horse-race between five utility functions. Technical report, CESifo, Munich, Germany.Google Scholar
• Murphy RO, Ackermann KA, Handgraaf M (2011) Measuring social value orientation. Judgment Decision Making 6(8):771–781.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Olson M (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, vol. 124 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Osborn AF (1953) Applied imagination.Google Scholar
• Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1991) Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information. Games Econom. Behav. 3(2):183–220.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Plott CR, Smith VL, eds. (2008) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, vol. 1 (North-Holland, Amsterdam).Google Scholar
• Samuelson L (2005) Economic theory and experimental economics. J. Econom. Literature 43(1):65–107.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Steiger E-M, Zultan R (2014) See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity. J. Public Econom. 109:1–12.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stigler GJ (1961) The economics of information. J. Political Econom. 69(3):213–225.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Strausz R (1999) Efficiency in sequential partnerships. J. Econom. Theory 85(1):140–156.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vesely S, Wengström E, et al.. (2017) Risk and cooperation: Experimental evidence from stochastic public good games. Working paper, Lund University, Sweden.Google Scholar
• Weitzman ML (1979) Optimal search for the best alternative. Econometrica 47(3):641–654.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weitzman ML (1998) Recombinant growth. Quart. J. Econom. 113(2):331–360.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Winter E (2006) Optimal incentives for sequential production processes. RAND J. Econom. 37(2):376–390.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Winter E (2009) Incentive reversal. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 1(2):133–147.Crossref, Google Scholar