Labor Boundaries and Skills: The Case of Lobbyists

References

• Abraham K, Taylor SK (1996) Firms’ use of outside contractors: Theory and evidence. J. Labor Econom. 14(3):394–424.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alfaro L, Conconi P, Fadinger H, Newman AF (2016) Do prices determine vertical integration? Rev. Econom. Stud. 83(3):855–888.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Al-Ubaydli O, McLaughlin PA (2017) RegData: A numerical database on industry-specific regulations for all U.S. industries and federal regulations, 1997-2012. Regulation Governance 11(1):109–123.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson E (1985) The salesperson as outside agent or employee: A transaction cost analysis. Marketing Sci. 4(3):177–266.Link, Google Scholar
• Anderson E (1988) Transaction costs as determinants of opportunism in integrated and independent sales forces. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 9(3):247–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson E, Schmittlein D (1984) Integration of the sales force: An empirical examination. RAND J. Econom. 15(3):385–395.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ansolabehere S, de Figueiredo JM, Snyder JM Jr (2003) Why is there so little money in US politics? J. Econom. Perspect. 17(1):105–130.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Antras P, Helpman E (2004) Global sourcing. J. Political Econom. 112(3):552–580.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Autor DH (2003) Outsourcing at will: The contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the growth of employment outsourcing. J. Labor Econom. 21(1):1–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Azoulay P (2004) Capturing knowledge within and across firm boundaries: Evidence from clinical development. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(5):1591–1612.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barrage L, Chyn E, Hastings J (2020) Advertising and environmental stewardship: Evidence from the BP oil spill. Amer. Econom. J.: Econom. Policy 12(1):33–61.Google Scholar
• Becker GS (1964) Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (National Bureau of Economic Research, New York).Google Scholar
• Berlingieri G (2014) Outsourcing and the rise in services. Discussion Paper No. 1199, CEP, London.Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Trebbi F (2014) Is it whom you know or what you know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(12):3885–3920.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blanes i Vidal J, Draca M, Fons-Rosen C (2012) Revolving door lobbyists. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(7):3731–3748.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bombardini M (2008) Firm heterogeneity and lobby participation. J. Internat. Econom. 75(2):329–348.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bombardini M, Trebbi F (2012) Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy? J. Internat. Econom. 87(1):18–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Byun H, Frake J, Agarwal R (2018) Leveraging who you know by what you know: Specialization and returns to relational capital. Strategic Management J. 39(7):1803–1833.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coase R (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica 4(16):386–405.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coffey B, McLaughlin PA, Tollison RD (2012) Regulators and redskins. Public Choice 153(2012):191–204.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Figueiredo JM, King JJ (2004) When do firms hire lobbyists? The organization of lobbying at the federal communications commission. Indust. Corporate Change 13(6):883–900.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Figueiredo JM, Richter B (2014) Advancing the empirical research on lobbying. Annual Rev. Political Sci. 17(1):163–185.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Figueiredo JM, Silverman BS (2006) Academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying. J. Law Econom. 49(2):597–625.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Drutman L (2010) The business of America is lobbying: The expansion of corporate political activity and the future of American pluralism. PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley.Google Scholar
• Dube A, Kaplan E (2007) The labor boundaries of the firm: Employment and independent contracting. Working paper, University of Maryland, College Park.Google Scholar
• Forbes S, Lederman M (2009) Adaptation and vertical integration in the airline industry. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(5):1831–1849.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibbons R (2005) Four formal(izable) theories of the firm. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 58(2):200–245.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gil R, Ruzzier CA (2017) The impact of competition on make or buy decisions: Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry. Management Sci. 64(3):1121–1135.Link, Google Scholar
• Grossman GM, Helpman E (2002) Special Interest Politics (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Grossman S, Hart O (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econom. 94(4):691–719.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart O (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Hart O, Moore JH (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Political Econom. 98(6):1119–1158.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hegde D, Sampat B (2015) Can private money buy public science? Disease group lobbying and federal funding for biomedical research. Management Sci. 61(10):2281–2298.Link, Google Scholar
• Heitshusen V (2015) Senate committee hearings: Arranging witnesses. Report 7-5700, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Hirsch AV, Montagnes P (2015) The lobbyist’s dilemma: Gatekeeping and the profit motive. Working paper, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA.Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7(Special issue):24–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jia N (2018) The make and/or buy decisions of corporate political lobbying: An integration of economic efficiency and legitimacy perspectives. Acad. Management Rev. 43(2):1–21.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kang K (2016) Policy influence and private returns from lobbying in the energy sector. Rev. Econom. Stud. 83(1):269–305.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kerr WR, Lincoln WF, Mishra P (2014) The dynamics of firm lobbying. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 6(4):343–379.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klein B (1988) Vertical integration as organized ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors relationship revisited. J. Law Econom. Organ. 4(1):199–213.Google Scholar
• Klein B, Murphy KM (1988) Vertical restraints as contract enforcement mechanisms. J. Law Econom. 31(2):265–297.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klein B, Crawford RG, Alchian AA (1978) Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. J. Law Econom. 21(2):297–326.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Knudsen E, Foss K (2014) The effect of recessions on firms’ boundaries. Indust. Corporate Change 9(9):1–28.Google Scholar
• Lafontaine F, Slade M (2007) Vertical integration and firm boundaries: The evidence. J. Econom. Literature 45(3):629–685.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lambert T (2019) Lobbying on regulatory enforcement actions: Evidence from U.S. commercial and savings banks. Management Sci. 65(6):2545–2572.Link, Google Scholar
• Langlois RN (1992) Transaction-cost economics in real time. Indust. Corporate Change 1(1):99–127.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Langlois RN (2006) The secret life of mundane transaction costs. Organ. Stud. 27(9):1389–1410.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Llanos M (2005) 44 Oil spills found in southeast Louisiana. NBC News (September 19), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9365607/ns/us_news-katrina_the_long_road_back/t/oil-spills-found-southeast-louisiana/.W2grFSj7REY.Google Scholar
• Monteverde K, Teece D (1982) Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell J. Econom. 13(1):206–213.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mulligan C, Shleifer A (2005) The extent of the market and the supply of regulation. Quart. J. Econom. 120(4):1445–1473.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parent D (2000) Industry-specific capital and the wage profile: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. J. Labor Econom. 18(2):306–323.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Reed S, Krauss C (2010) After settlement, relief at a diminished BP. New York Times (July 2), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/business/energy-environment/diminished-bp-in-deepwater-horizon-settlement.html?_r=0.Google Scholar
• Richter BK, Krislert S, Timmons JF (2009) Lobbying and taxes. Amer. J. Political Sci. 53(4):893–909.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rosen S (1983) Specialization and human capital. J. Labor Econom. 1(1):43–49.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sachs R (1999) Hearings in the House of Representatives: A guide for preparation and conduct. Report 96-623, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Simon H (1951) A formal theory of the employment relationship. Econometrica 19(3):293–305.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stigler GJ (1951) The division of labor is limited by the extent of the market. J. Political Econom. 59(3):185–193.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sullivan J (2007) How Our Laws Are Made (The Library of Congress GPO Office, Washington, DC).Google Scholar
• Tadelis S, Williamson O (2012) Transaction cost economies. Gibbons R, Roberts DJ, eds. Handbook of Organizational Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 159–192.Google Scholar
• Wheaton S (2010) Protesters gather at BP stations. New York Times (June 2), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/us/03boycott.html?_r=0.Google Scholar
• Whinston M (2001) Assessing the property rights and transaction-cost theories of firm scope. Amer. Econom. Rev. 91(2):184–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Whinston M (2003) On the transaction cost determinants of vertical integration. J. Law Econom. Organ. 19(1):1–23.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1971) The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 61(2):112–123.Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1973) Markets and hierarchies: Some elementary considerations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 63(2):316–325.Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (Free Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1979) Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. J. Law Econom. 22(2):233–261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Williamson O (1991) Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Admin. Sci. Quart. 2(36):269–296.Google Scholar