Spatial Distribution of Access to Service: Theory and Evidence from Ride-Sharing
References
- (2023) Ride-hailing networks with strategic drivers: The impact of platform control capabilities on performance. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 25(5):1890–1908.Link, Google Scholar
- (2020) Thickness and information in dynamic matching markets. J. Political Econom. 128(3):783–815.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2019) On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets. Oper. Res. 67(4):927–949.Abstract, Google Scholar
- (2018) The value of state dependent control in ridesharing systems. Preprint, submitted March 13, https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04959v1.Google Scholar
- (2021) Surge pricing and its spatial supply response. Management Sci. 67(3):1350–1367.Link, Google Scholar
- (2019) Spatial pricing in ride-sharing networks. Oper. Res. 67(3):744–769.Link, Google Scholar
- (2023) Search frictions and efficiency in decentralized transport markets. Quart. J. Econom. 138(4):2451–2503.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2022) Spatial equilibrium, search frictions, and dynamic efficiency in the taxi industry. Rev. Econom. Stud. 89(2):556–591.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2025) Matching and pricing in ride hailing: Wild goose chases and how to solve them. Management Sci. 71(5):4377–4395.Link, Google Scholar
- CBS News (2018) New York City Council puts cap on Uber, other ride-hailing services. (August 8), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/uber-cap-nyc-lyft-other-ride-hailing-services-licenses-new-york-city-council-wednesday/.Google Scholar
- (2016) Using big data to estimate consumer surplus: The case of Uber. NBER Working Paper No. 22627, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- (2016) Disruptive change in the taxi business: The case of Uber. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(5):177–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2021) Impacts of transportation network companies on urban mobility. Nature Sustainability 4(6):494–500.Crossref, Google Scholar
- Fortune Business Insights (2021) Ride sharing market size, share & COVID-19 impact analysis. Market research report, Fortune Business Insights, Pune, India.Google Scholar
- (2019) Frictions in a competitive, regulated market: Evidence from taxis. Amer. Econom. Rev. 109(8):2954–2992.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2017) An analysis of the labor market for Uber’s driver-partners in the United States. ILR Rev. 71(3):705–732.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2019) Uber, public transit, and urban transportation equity: A case study in New York City. Professional Geographer 71(2):315–330.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2017) Demand and consumer surplus in the on-demand economy: The case of ride sharing. Preprint, submitted July 7, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2997190.Google Scholar
- (1989) A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete response models without numerical integration. Econometrica 57(5):995–1026.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2018) Thickness and competition in ride-sharing markets. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
- (2018) An earnings standard for New York City’s app-based drivers: Economic analysis and policy assessment. Report, New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, New York.Google Scholar
- (2001) Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching function. J. Econom. Literature 39(2):390–431.Crossref, Google Scholar
- (2020) Competing platforms and transport equilibrium: Evidence from New York City. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- (2023) Competing platforms and transport equilibrium. Working paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
- (2018) Density of demand and the benefit of Uber. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.Google Scholar

