Designing Product Development Contracts in the Presence of Managerial Lobbying

References

• Akerlof G, Yellon J (1990) The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment. Quart. J. Econom. 105(2):255–283.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arya A, Glover J, Mittendorf B, Ye L (2005) On the use of customized vs. standardized performance measures. J. Management Accounting Res. 17(1):7–21.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Balakrishnan R, Lin H, Sivaramakrishnan K (2020) Screening talent for task assignment: Absolute or percentile thresholds? J. Accounting Res. 58:831–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Begley CG, Ellis LM (2012) Drug development: Raise standards for preclinical cancer research. Nature 483(7391):531–533.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bernardo A, Cai H, Luo J (2001) Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard. J. Financial Econom. 61(3):311–344.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beyer A, Guttman I, Marinovic I (2019) Earnings management and earnings quality: Theory and evidence. Accounting Rev. 94(4):77–101.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clark D, Riis C (2001) Rank-order tournaments and selection. J. Econom. 73(2):167–191.Google Scholar
• Cooper R (2001) Winning at New Products: Creating Value Through Innovation (Basic Books).Google Scholar
• Cooper R, Edgett S, Kleinschmidt E (2001) Portfolio Management for New Products (Perseus Books).Google Scholar
• Cooper WW, Seiford LM, Zhu J (2004) Data envelopment analysis. Handbook on Data Envelopment Analysis (Springer, Berlin), 1–39.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Donthu N, Yoo B (1998) Cultural influences on service quality expectations. J. Service Res. 1(2):178–186.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dutta S, Reichelstein S (2002) Controlling investment decisions: Depreciation and capital charges. Rev. Accounting Stud. 7:253–281.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Friebel G, Raith M (2010) Resource allocation and organizational form. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 2(2):1–33.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):74–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamakura WA, Mittal V, de Rosa F, Mazzon JA (2002) Assessing the service-profit chain. Marketing Sci. 21(3):294–317.Link, Google Scholar
• Kedia S, Philippon T (2009) The economics of fraudulent accounting. Rev. Financial Stud. 22(6):2169–2199.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kuksov D, Villas-Boas JM (2019) The performance measurement trap. Marketing Sci. 38(1):68?87.Google Scholar
• Laux V (2008) Board independence and ceo turnover. J. Accounting Res. 46(1):137–171.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazear E, Rosen S (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J. Political Econom. 89(5):841–864.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levy D, Bergen M, Dutta S, Venable R (1997) The magnitude of menu costs: Direct evidence from large U.S. supermarket chains. Quart. J. Econom. 112(3):791–825.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mantrala MK, Sinha P, Zoltners AA (1994) Structuring a multiproduct sales quota-bonus plan for a heterogeneous sales force: A practical model-based approach. Marketing Sci. 13(2):121–144.Link, Google Scholar
• Marinovic I, Povel P (2017) Competition for talent under performance manipulation. J. Accounting Econom. 64(1):1–14.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P, Roberts J (1988) Economic theories of the firm: Past, present, and future. Canadian J. Econom. 21(3):444–458.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Moldovanu B, Shi X (2013) Specialization and partisanship in committee search. Theoretical Econom. 8(3):751–774.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Peng L, Rell A (2008) Manipulation and equity-based compensation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(2):285–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prinz F, Schlange T, Asadullah K (2011) Believe it or not: How much can we rely on published data on potential drug targets? National Rev. Drug Discovery 10(9):712.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Raju JS, Srinivasan V (1996) Quota-based compensation plans for multiterritory heterogeneous salesforces. Management Sci. 42(10):1454–1462.Link, Google Scholar
• Rosar F (2015) Continuous decisions by a committee: Median vs. average mechanisms. J. Econom. Theory 159:15–65.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sah RK, Stiglitz JE (1988) Committees, hierarchies and polyarchies. Econom. J. (London) 98(391):451–470.Google Scholar
• Simester D, Zhang J (2014) Why do salespeople spend so much time lobbying for low prices? Marketing Sci. 33(6):796–808.Link, Google Scholar
• Simester D, Zhang J (2010) Why are bad products so hard to kill. Management Sci. 56(7):1161–1179.Link, Google Scholar