Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior

References

• Abeler J, Falk A, Goette L, Huffman D (2011) Reference points and effort provision. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(2):470–492.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Allen EJ, Dechow PM, Pope DG, Wu G (2017) Reference-dependent preferences: Evidence from marathon runners. Management Sci. 63(6):1657–1672.Link, Google Scholar
• Armantier O, Boly A (2015) Framing of incentives and effort provision. Internat. Econom. Rev. 56(3):917–938.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2016) Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2016 Global Fraud Study. Technical report, Austin, Texas.Google Scholar
• Barberis NC (2013) Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. J. Econom. Perspect. 27(1):173–196.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barbos A (2010) Context effects: A representation of choices from categories. J. Econom. Theory 145(3):1224–1243.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Belot M, Schröder M (2013) Sloppy work, lies and theft: A novel experimental design to study counterproductive behaviour. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93(3):233–238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Belot M, Schröder M (2016) The spillover effects of monitoring: A field experiment. Management Sci. 62(1):37–45.Link, Google Scholar
• Bowles S (1998) Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. J. Econom. Literature 36(1):75–111.Google Scholar
• Bradler C, Neckermann S (2016) The magic of the personal touch: Field experimental evidence on money and appreciation as gifts. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 121(3):1189–1221.Google Scholar
• Breza E, Kaur S, Shamdasani Y (2018) The morale effects of pay inequality. Quart. J. Econom. 133(2):611–663.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brooks RRW, Stremitzer A, Tontrup S (2012) Framing contracts: Why loss framing increases effort. J. Institutional Theoretical Econom. 168(1):62–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brownback A, Sadoff S (2019) Improving college instruction through incentives. J. Political Econom. 128(8):2925–2972.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulte E, List JA, Van Soest D (2019) Toward an understanding of the welfare effects of nudges: Evidence from a field experiment in Uganda. NBER Working Paper 26286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Buser T, Dreber A (2016) The flipside of comparative payment schemes. Management Sci. 62(9):2626–2638.Link, Google Scholar
• Cameron JS, Miller DT (2009) Ethical standards in gain vs. loss frames. De Cremer D, ed. Psychological Perspectives on Ethical Behavior (Information Age Publishing, Charlotte, NC), 91–106.Google Scholar
• Chetty R, Friedman JN, Olsen T, Pistaferri L (2011) Adjustment costs, firm responses, and micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: Evidence from Danish tax records. Quart. J. Econom. 126(2):749–804.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang JX (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. Econom. Theory 33:67–80.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Danilov A, Vogelsang T (2016) Time for helping. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 2(1):36–47.Crossref, Google Scholar
• De Giorgi EG, Post T (2011) Loss aversion with a state-dependent reference point. Management Sci. 57(6):1094–1110.Link, Google Scholar
• DellaVigna S, Pope D (2017) What motivates effort? Evidence and expert forecasts. Rev. Econom. Stud. 85(2):1029–1069.Crossref, Google Scholar
• De Quidt J (2017) Your loss is my gain: A recruitment experiment with framed incentives. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 51(5):351–365.Google Scholar
• De Quidt J, Fallucchi F, Kölle F, Nosenzo D, Quercia S (2017) Bonus vs. penalty: How robust are the effects of contract framing? J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 3(3):1–9.Google Scholar
• Dur R (2009) Gift exchange in the workplace: Money or attention? J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 7(2–3):550–560.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Englmaier F, Grimm S, Schindler D, Schudy S (2018) The Effect of incentives in non-routine analytical teams tasks—Evidence from a field experiment. CESifo Working Paper No. 6903, CESifo, Munich.Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (2006) The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism—experimental evidence and new theories. Kolm SC, Ythier JM, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity (Elsevier), 1:615–691.Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U, Föllmi-Heusi F (2013) Lies in disguise—An experimental study on cheating. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(3):525–547.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fryer R, Levitt S, List J, Sadoff S (2012) Enhancing the efficacy of teacher incentives through loss aversion: A field experiment. NBER Working Paper No. 18237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Gall T, Hu X, Vlassopolous M (2016) Dynamic incentive effects of team formation: Experimental evidence. IZA Discussion Papers 10393, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).Google Scholar
• Gilboa I, Minardi S, Wang F (2020) Consumption of values. HEC Paris Research Paper No. ECO/SCD-2020-1406, France.Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Imas A (2014) Materazzi effect and the strategic use of anger in competitive interactions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111(4):1334–1337.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Rustichini A (2000) Pay enough or don’t pay at all. Quart. J. Econom. 115(3):791–810.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Kajackaite A, Sobel J (2018) Lying aversion and the size of the lie. Amer. Econom. Rev. 108(2):419–453.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Meier S, Rey-Biel P (2011) When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify behavior. J. Econom. Perspect. 25(4):191–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goette L, Huffman D, Meier S, Sutter M (2012) Competition between organizational groups: Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations. Management Sci. 58(5):948–960.Link, Google Scholar
• Gravert C (2013) How luck and performance affect stealing. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93(C):301–304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grolleau G, Kocher MG, Sutan A (2016) Cheating and loss aversion: Do people cheat more to avoid a loss? Management Sci. 62(12):3428–3438.Link, Google Scholar
• Guney B, Richter M, Tsur M (2018) Aspiration-based choice. J. Econom. Theory 176(C):935–956.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hannan RL, Hoffman VB, Moser DV (2005) Bonus vs. penalty: Does contract frame affect employee effort? Rapoport A, Zwic R, eds. Experimental Business Research, vol. II (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg), 151–169.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Harbring C, Irlenbusch B (2011) Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Sci. 57(4):611–627.Link, Google Scholar
• Hermann D, Mußhoff O (2019) I might be a liar, but I am not a thief: An experimental distinction between the moral costs of lying and stealing. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 163:135–139.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law, Economics, Organization 7:24–52.Google Scholar
• Hong F, Hossain T, List JA (2015) Framing manipulations in contests: A natural field experiment. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 118:372–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hossain T, List JA (2012) The behavioralist visits the factory: Increasing productivity using simple framing manipulations. Management Sci. 58(12):2151–2167.Link, Google Scholar
• Hsee CK, Yu F, Zhang J, Zhang Y (2003) Medium maximization. J. Consumer Res. 30(1):1–14.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Imas A (2016) The realization effect: Risk-taking after realized vs. paper losses. Amer. Econom. Rev. 106(8):2086–2109.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Imas A, Sadoff S, Samek A (2017) Do people anticipate loss aversion? Management Sci. 63(5):1271–1284.Link, Google Scholar
• Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47(2):263–292.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kajackaite A, Gneezy U (2017) Incentives and cheating. Games Econom. Behav. 102:433–444.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kern MC, Chugh D (2009) Bounded ethicality: The perils of loss framing. Psych. Sci. 20(3):378–384.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kleven HJ (2016) Bunching. Annual Rev. Econom. 8:435–464.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koszegi B (2006) Emotional agency. Quart. J. Econom. 121(1):121–155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levitt SD, List JA, Neckermann S, Sadoff S (2016) The behavioralist goes to school: Leveraging behavioral economics to improve educational performance. Amer. Econom. J. Econom. Policy 8(4):183–219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Loewenstein G (2000) Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(2):426–432.Google Scholar
• Maltz A (2020) Exogenous endowment-endogenous reference point. Econom. J. (London). 130(625):160–182.Google Scholar
• Masatlioglu Y, Ok EA (2014) A canonical model of choice with initial endowments. Rev. Econom. Stud. 81(2):851–883.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mazar N, Amir O, Ariely D (2008) The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. J. Marketing Res. 45(6):633–644.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Neckermann S, Cueni R, Frey BS (2014) Awards at work. Labour Econom. 31(C):205–217.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ockenfels A, Sliwka D, Werner P (2015) Bonus payments and reference point violations. Management Sci. 61(7):1496–1513.Link, Google Scholar
• Ok EA, Ortoleva P, Riella G (2015) Revealed (p)reference theory. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(1):299–321.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ortoleva P (2010) Status quo bias, multiple priors and uncertainty aversion. Games Econom. Behav. 69(2):411–424.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pettit NC, Doyle SP, Lount RB, To C (2016) Cheating to get ahead or to avoid falling behind? The effect of potential negative vs. positive status change on unethical behavior. Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 137:172–183.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pierce L, Rees-Jones A, Blank C (2020) The negative consequences of loss-framed performance incentives. NBER Working Paper 26619, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Pierce L, Snow DC, McAfee A (2015) Cleaning house: The impact of information technology monitoring on employee theft and productivity. Management Sci. 61(10):2299–2319.Link, Google Scholar
• Podsakoff PM, MacKenzie SB, Paine JB, Bachrach DG (2000) Organizational citizenship behaviors: A critical review of the theoretical and empirical literature and suggestions for future research. J. Management 26(3):513–563.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rabin M (1994) Cognitive dissonance and social change. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 23(2):177–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Riella G, Teper R (2014) Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias. Games Econom. Behav. 87:288–304.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rubin J, Samek A, Sheremeta RM (2018) Loss aversion and the quantity-quality tradeoff. Experiment. Econom. 21(2):292–315.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ruggeri K, Alí S, Berge ML, Bertoldo G, Bjørndal LD, Cortijos-Bernabeu A, Davison C, et al. (2020) Replicating patterns of prospect theory for decision under risk. Nature Human Behav. 4:622–633.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schindler S, Pfattheicher S (2017) The frame of the game: Loss-framing increases dishonest behavior. J. Experiment. Soc. Psych. 69:172–177.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schurr A, Ritov I (2016) Winning a competition predicts dishonest behavior. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 113(7):1754–1759.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shalvi S (2012) Dishonestly increasing the likelihood of winning. Judgment Decision Making 7(3):292–303.Google Scholar
• Shalvi S, Handgraaf MJJ, De Dreu CK (2011) Ethical manoeuvring: Why people avoid both major and minor lies. British J. Management 22(s1):S16–S27.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thaler RH, Johnson EJ (1990) Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management Sci. 36(6):643–660.Link, Google Scholar
• Tversky A, Kahneman D (1991) Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model. Quart. J. Econom. 106(4):1039–1061.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Young A (2019) Channeling Fisher: Randomization tests and the statistical insignificance of seemingly significant experimental results. Quart. J. Econom. 134(2):557–598.Crossref, Google Scholar