Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture

References

• Akerlof GA (1980) A theory of social custom of which unenployment may be one consequence. Quart. J. Econom. 94:749–775.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2000) Economics and identity. Quart. J. Econom. 115(3):715–753.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akerlof GA, Kranton R (2010) Identity economics. Economists Voice 7(2):1–3.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ambrus A, Greiner B (2012) Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment: An experimental study. Amer. Econom. Rev. 102(7):3317–3332.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bellemare C, Sebald A (2019) Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations. Technical report, IZA Institute for Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany.Google Scholar
• Bester H, Münster J (2016) Subjective evaluation vs. public information. Econom. Theory 61:723–753.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bicchieri C, Dimant E, Gächter S, Nosenzo D (2022) Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance. Games Econom. Behav. 132:59–72.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Binmore K, Swierzbinski J, Hsu S, Proulx C (1993) Focal points and bargaining. Internat. J. Game Theory 22(4):381–409.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bolton G, Greiner B, Ockenfels A (2013) Engineering trust: Reciprocity in the production of reputation information. Management Sci. 59(2):265–285.Link, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Cooper DJ (2007) It’s what you say, not what you pay: An experimental study of manager-employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 5(6):1223–1268.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, MacLeod WB (1995) On the strategic stability of equilibria in experimental games. Games Econom. Behav. 11:36–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brandts J, Ellman M, Charness G (2015) Let’s talk: How communication affects contract design. J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 14(4):943–974.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown M, Falk A, Fehr E (2004) Relational contracts and the nature of market interactions. Econometrica 72(3):747–780.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carmichael HL, MacLeod WB (1997) Gift giving and the evolution of cooperation. Internat. Econom. Rev. 38(3):485–509.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cason TN, Mui V-L (2007) Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game. Experiment. Econom. 10(3):251–267.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cason TN, Mui V-L (2014) Coordinating resistance through communication and repeated interaction. Econom. J. (London) 124(574):F226–F256.Google Scholar
• Charness G, Dufwenberg M (2006) Promises and partnership. Econometrica 74(6):1579–1601.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chaudhuri A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: A selective survey of the literature. Experiment. Econom. 14(1):47–83.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coleman PT, Deutsch M, Marcus EC (2014) The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (John Wiley Sons, New York).Google Scholar
• Cooper D, Kagel J (2016) Other regarding preferences: A selective survey of experimental results. Kagel JH, Roth AE, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics, vol. 2 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ), 217–289.Google Scholar
• Cooper R, DeJong DV, Forsythe R, Ross TW (1992) Communication in coordination games. Quart. J. Econom. 107(2):739–771.Crossref, Google Scholar
• De Dreu CK, Gelfand MJ (2008) The Psychology of Conflict and Conflict Management in Organizations (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New York).Google Scholar
• DeGroot MH (1972) Optimal Statistical Decisions (McGraw-Hill, New York).Google Scholar
• Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2008) Winners don’t punish. Nature 452(7185):348.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Egas M, Riedl A (2008) The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation. Proc. Roy. Soc. 275(1637):871–878.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eisenhardt KM (1989) Agency theory: An assessment and review. Acad. Management Rev. 14(1):57–74.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Falk A, Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) On the nature of fair behavior. Econom. Inquiry 41(1):20–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2003) The nature of human altruism. Nature 425(6960):785–791.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2004a) Social norms and human cooperation. Trends Cognitive Sci. 8(4):185–190.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2004b) Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution Human Behav. 25(2):63–87.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Schmidt KM (1999) A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quart. J. Econom. 114(3):817–868.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Fischbacher U, Gächter S (2002) Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13(1):1–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E, Hart O, Zehnder C (2011) Contracts as reference points: Experimental evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101:493–525.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experiment. Econom. 10(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fischbacher U, Gächter S, Fehr E (2001) Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Econom. Lett. 71(3):397–404.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gächter S (2007) Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the laboratory and the field and their policy implications. Frey BS, Stutzer A, eds. Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 19–50.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gächter S, Fehr E (2000) Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Amer. Econom. Rev. 90(4):980–994.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gächter S, Renner E, Sefton M (2008) The long-run benefits of punishment. Science 322(5907):1510–1510.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibbons R (1997) Incentives and careers in organizations. Kreps DM, Wallis KF, eds. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK), 1–37.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U (2005) Deception: The role of consequences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(1):384–394.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gneezy U, Rockenbach B, Serra-Garcia M (2013) Measuring lying aversion. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 93:293–300.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Graham JR, Grennan J, Harvey CR, Rajgopal S (2022) Corporate culture: Evidence from the field. J. Financial Econom. 146(2):552–593.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grechenig K, Nicklisch A, Thöni C (2010) Punishment despite reasonable doubt—A public goods experiment with sanctions under uncertainty. J. Empirical Legal Stud. 7(4):847–867.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with ORSEE. J. Econom. Sci. Assoc. 1(1):114–125.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Groysberg B, Lee J, Price J, Cheng J (2018) The leader’s guide to corporate culture. Harvard Bus. Rev. 96(1):44–52.Google Scholar
• Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2006) Does culture affect economic outcomes? J. Econom. Perspective 20(2):23–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Güth W, Schmittberger R, Schwarze B (1982) An experimental-analysis of ultimatum bargaining. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 3(4):367–388.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hall B (2000) Compensation and performance evaluation at arrow electronics. Technical report, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Kagel JH, Kim C, Moser D (1996) Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs. Games Econom. Behav. 13(1):100–110.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH (1986) Fairness and the assumptions of economics. J. Bus. 59(4):S285–S300.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kampkötter P, Sliwka D (2016) The complementary use of experiments and field data to evaluate management practices: The case of subjective performance evaluations. J. Institutional Theoretical Econom. 172(2):364–389.Google Scholar
• Kerr S (1975) On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Acad. Management J. 18(4):769–783.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Khalil F, Lawarree J, Scott TJ (2015) Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information. RAND J. Econom. 46(4):872–890.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koszegi B (2014) Behavioral contract theory. J. Econom. Literature 52(4):1075–1118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krupka EL, Weber RA (2013) Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? J. Eur. Econom. Assoc. 11(3):495–524.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krupka EL, Leider S, Jiang M (2017) A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms. Management Sci. 63(6):1708–1729.Link, Google Scholar
• Lazear EP (1986) Salaries and piece rates. J. Bus. 59:405–431.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leibbrandt A, López-Pérez R (2012) An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 84(3):753–766.Crossref, Google Scholar
• López-Pérez R (2008) Aversion to norm-breaking: A model. Games Econom. Behav. 64(1):237–267.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lundquist T, Ellingsen T, Gribbe E, Johannesson M (2009) The aversion to lying. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 70(1–2):81–92.Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacLeod WB (2003) Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(1):216–240.Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacLeod WB, Malcomson JM (1998) Motivation and markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 88(3):388–411.Google Scholar
• McAdams RH (2017) The Expressive Powers of Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Nosenzo D, Görges L (2020) Measuring social norms in economics: Why it is important and how it is done. Anal. Kritik 42(2):285–312.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ockenfels A, Sliwka D, Werner P (2015) Bonus payments and reference point violations. Management Sci. 61(7):1496–1513.Link, Google Scholar
• Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. Amer. Political Sci. Rev. 86(2):404–417.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prasnikar V, Roth AE (1992) Considerations of fairness and strategy: Experimental data from sequential games. Quart. J. Econom. 107(3):865–888.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schmitz PW (2002) On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems. J. Econom. Theory 103(2):444–460.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sebald A, Walzl M (2014) Subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in principal–agent relations. Scandinavian J. Econom. 116(2):570–590.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tjosvold D, Wong AS, Feng Chen NY (2014) Constructively managing conflicts in organizations. Annu. Rev. Organ. Psych. Organ. Behav. 1(1):545–568.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vuong QH (1989) Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses. Econometrica 57(2):307–333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weber M (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (The Free Press, New York).Google Scholar