Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets

References

• Abdulkadiroglu A , Dur UM , Grigoryan A (2021) School assignment by match quality. NBER Working Paper No. 28512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Adhvaryu A , Bassi V , Nyshadham A , Tamayo JA (2020) No line left behind: Assortative matching inside the firm. NBER Working Paper No. 27006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Agarwal N , Hodgson C , Somaini P (2020) Choices and outcomes in assignment mechanisms: The allocation of deceased donor kidneys. NBER Working Paper No. 28064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Allocca A (2023) ‘No man is an island’: An empirical study on team formation and performance. Preprint, submitted February 28, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4365260.Google Scholar
• Alonso R , Matouschek N (2008) Optimal delegation. Rev. Econom. Stud. 75(1):259–293.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arya A , Glover J , Routledge BR (2002) Project assignment rights and incentives for eliciting ideas. Management Sci. 48(7):886–899.Link, Google Scholar
• Ashlagi I , Kanoria Y , Leshno JD (2017) Unbalanced random matching markets: The stark effect of competition. J. Political Econom. 125(1):69–98.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aucejo E , Coate P , Fruehwirth JC , Kelly S , Mozenter Z (2022) Teacher effectiveness and classroom composition: Understanding match effects in the classroom. Econom. J. (London) 132(648):3047–3064.Google Scholar
• Autor DH , Levy F , Murnane RJ (2003) The skill content of recent technological change. Quart. J. Econom. 118(4):1279–1333.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ba B , Bayer P , Rim N , Rivera R , Sidibé M (2021) Police officer assignment and neighborhood crime. NBER Working Paper No. 29243, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Baker G , Holmstrom B (1995) Internal labor markets: Too many theories, too few facts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 85(2):255–259.Google Scholar
• Bandiera O , Barankay I , Rasul I (2010) Social incentives in the workplace. Rev. Econom. Stud. 77(2):417–458.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barron G , Vardy F (2005) The internal job market of the IMF’s economist program. IMF Staff Papers 52(3):410–429.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bartling B , Fehr E , Herz H (2014) The intrinsic value of decision rights. Econometrica 82(6):2005–2039.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bates MD , Dinerstein M , Johnston AC , Sorkin I (2022) Teacher labor market equilibrium and the distribution of student achievement. NBER Working Paper No. 29728, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Becker G (1964) Human Capital (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Google Scholar
• Becker GS (1973) A theory of marriage: Part I. J. Political Econom. 81(4):813–846.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bellet CS , De Neve J-E , Ward G (2023) Does employee happiness have an impact on productivity? Management Sci. 70(3):1656–1679.Link, Google Scholar
• Benson A , Li D , Shue K (2019) Promotions and the Peter Principle. Quart. J. Econom. 134(4):2085–2134.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benson A , Li D , Shue K (2021) Potential and the gender promotion gap. Acad. Management Proc. 2023(1).Google Scholar
• Bloesch J , Larsen B , Taska B (2022) Which workers earn more at productive firms? Position specific skills and individual worker hold-up power. Working paper, Cornell Department of Economics and School Industrial and Labor Relations, Ithaca, NY.Google Scholar
• Bloom N , Van Reenen J (2011) Human resource management and productivity. Ashenfelter O, Card D, eds. Handbook of Labor Economics , vol. 4 (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 1697–1767.Google Scholar
• Boyd D , Lankford H , Loeb S , Wyckoff J (2013) Analyzing the determinants of the matching of public school teachers to jobs: Disentangling the preferences of teachers and employers. J. Labor Econom. 31(1):83–117.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bresnahan TF , Brynjolfsson E , Hitt LM (2002) Information technology, workplace organization, and the demand for skilled labor: Firm-level evidence. Quart. J. Econom. 117(1):339–376.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brynjolfsson E , Hitt LM (2000) Beyond computation: Information technology, organizational transformation and business performance. J. Econom. Perspect. 14(4):23–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cappelli P (2013) HR for neophytes. Harvard Bus. Rev. 91(10):25–27.Google Scholar
• Caroli E , Van Reenen J (2001) Skill-biased organizational change? Evidence from a panel of British and French establishments. Quart. J. Econom. 116(4):1449–1492.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cassar L , Meier S (2018) Nonmonetary incentives and the implications of work as a source of meaning. J. Econom. Perspect. 32(3):215–238.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cestone G , Fumagalli C , Kramarz F , Pica G (2023) Exploiting growth opportunities: The role of internal labor markets. Rev. Econom. Stud. rdad094.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Christensen M , Knudsen T (2010) Design of decision-making organizations. Management Sci. 56(1):71–89.Link, Google Scholar
• Combe J , Dur UM , Tercieux O , Terrier C , Ünver MU (2022) Market design for distributional objectives in (re) assignment. Technical report, Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France.Google Scholar
• Cowgill B , Koning R (2018) Matching markets for Googlers. Harvard Business School Case 718-487, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Cowgill B , Cullen Z , Nguyen A , Perez-Truglia R (2020) Gender segregation in the workplace. Working paper, Columbia Business School New York, New York.Google Scholar
• Dahlstrand A (2021) Defying distance? The provision of services in the digital age. Working paper, University of Zurich, Zürich.Google Scholar
• Davis JMV (2022) Labor market design can improve match outcomes: Evidence from matching Teach For America teachers to schools. Working paper, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR.Google Scholar
• Davis JMV , Greenberg K , Jones D (2023) An experimental evaluation of deferred acceptance: Evidence from over 100 Army officer labor markets. NBER Working Paper No. 31612, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Delgado W (2014) Stable assignment problems for staffing: Negotiated complete stable matchings. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Georgia Tech, Atlanta.Google Scholar
• Deming DJ (2017) The growing importance of social skills in the labor market. Quart. J. Econom. 132(4):1593–1640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deming D , Kahn LB (2018) Skill requirements across firms and labor markets: Evidence from job postings for professionals. J. Labor Econom. 36(S1):S337–S369.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dessein W (2002) Authority and communication in organizations. Rev. Econom. Stud. 69(4):811–838.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dessein W , Santos T (2006) Adaptive organizations. J. Political Econom. 114(5):956–995.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Friebel G , Raith M (2022) Talent management: The role of bosses. Working paper, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany.Google Scholar
• Fuller J , Kerr W (2022) The Great Resignation didn’t start with the pandemic. Harvard Bus. Rev. (March 23), https://hbr.org/2022/03/the-great-resignation-didnt-start-with-the-pandemic.Google Scholar
• Gale D , Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Amer. Math. Monthly 69(1):9–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Graham BS (2011) Econometric methods for the analysis of assignment problems in the presence of complementarity and social spillovers. Benhabib J, Bisin A, Jackson MO, eds. Handbook of Social Economics , vol. 1 (North Holland, Amsterdam), 965–1052.Google Scholar
• Haegele I (2021) Talent hoarding in organizations. Working paper, Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich, Munich, Germany.Google Scholar
• Hamilton BH , Nickerson JA , Owan H (2003) Team incentives and worker heterogeneity. J. Political Econom. 111(3):465–497.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hammer M , Champy J (2009) Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution (HarperCollins Publishers, New York).Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):74–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hsieh C-T , Klenow PJ (2009) Misallocation and manufacturing TFP in China and India. Quart. J. Econom. 124(4):1403–1448.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Immorlica N , Mahdian M (2005) Marriage, honesty, and stability. Proc. 16th Annual ACM-SIAM Sympos. Discrete Algorithms (Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia), 53–62.Google Scholar
• Impink SM , Prat A , Sadun R (2021) Communication within firms: Evidence from CEO turnovers. NBER Working Paper No. 29042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Knuth DE (1976) Mariages Stables et Leurs Relations avec d’autres Problemes Combinatoires (Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, Montréal).Google Scholar
• Kojima F , Pathak PA (2009) Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(3):608–627.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kojima F , Sun N , Yu NN (2020) Job matching under constraints. Amer. Econom. Rev. 110(9):2935–2947.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kuhn HW (1955) The Hungarian method for the assignment problem. Naval Res. Logist. Quart. 2(1–2):83–97.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kurtulus FA , Kruse DL (2017) How Did Employee Ownership Firms Weather the Last Two Recessions? Employee Ownership, Employment Stability, and Firm Survival: 1999–2011 (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI).Google Scholar
• Lazear EP , Shaw KL , Stanton CT (2015) The value of bosses. J. Labor Econom. 33(4):823–861.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee MY , Edmondson AC (2017) Self-managing organizations: Exploring the limits of less-hierarchical organizing. Res. Organ. Behav. 37:35–58.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lindbeck A , Snower DJ (2000) Multitask learning and the reorganization of work: From Tayloristic to holistic organization. J. Labor Econom. 18(3):353–376.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Martela F (2019) What makes self-managing organizations novel? J. Organ. Design 8(1):1–23.Google Scholar
• Mas A , Moretti E (2009) Peers at work. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(1):112–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mauras S (2021) Two-sided random matching markets: Ex-ante equivalence of the deferred acceptance procedures. ACM Trans. Econom. Comput. 9(4):1–14.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Minni V (2022) Making the invisible hand visible: Managers and the allocation of workers to jobs. Working paper, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.Google Scholar
• Ortega J (2001) Job rotation as a learning mechanism. Management Sci. 47(10):1361–1370.Link, Google Scholar
• Osterman P (1994) How common is workplace transformation and who adopts it? Indust. Labor Relations Rev. 47(2):173–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Oswald AJ , Proto E , Sgroi D (2015) Happiness and productivity. J. Labor Econom. 33(4):789–822.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Oyer P (2004) Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects? J. Finance 59(4):1619–1650.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Park S (2019) Socializing at work: Evidence from a field experiment with manufacturing workers. Amer. Econom. J. Appl. Econom. 11(3):424–455.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Perry EL , Kulik CT (2008) The devolution of HR to the line. Internat. J. Human Resources Management 19(2):262–273.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pigou AC (1912) Wealth and Welfare (Macmillan and Company, Limited, London).Google Scholar
• Pittel B (1992) On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem. Ann. Appl. Probab. 2(2):358–401.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Raveendran M , Puranam P , Warglien M (2021) Division of labor through self-selection. Organ. Sci. 33(2):810–830.Link, Google Scholar
• Roth AE (2008) Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. Internat. J. Game Theory 36(3–4):537–569.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth AE , Peranson E (1999) The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. Amer. Econom. Rev. 89(4):748–780.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roth AE , Sotomayor M (1990) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sonmez T , Switzer TB (2013) Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy. Econometrica 81(2):451–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thakur A (2021) Matching in the civil service. Working paper, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore.Google Scholar
• Whittaker S , Marchington M (2003) Devolving HR responsibility to the line: Threat, opportunity or partnership? Employee Relations 25(3):245–261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Xu G , Bertrand M , Burgess R (2023) Organization of the state: Home assignment and bureaucrat performance. J. Law Econom. Organ. 39(2):371–419.Crossref, Google Scholar