Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets

The authors thank participants at National Bureau of Economic Research Economics of Organizations (2022), National Bureau of Economic Research/Conferences on Econometrics and Mathematical Economics Decentralization (2022), SIOE, Wharton People and Organizations, the Marketplace Innovations Workshop, Academy of Management Conference, the Workshop for Information Systems and Economics (WISE), Strategic Management Society Conference, and the 2021 Causal Data Science Meeting, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, Columbia, Cornell, MIT, Rochester, Stanford (GSB), University of Minnesota, and University of Hong Kong. The authors also thank Amanda Dahlstrand, Bob Gibbons, John Hatfield, Navin Kartik, Yash Kanoria, Fuhito Kojima, Scott Kominers, Jin Li, John Morgan, Parag Pathak, Alex Teytelboym and Brian Wu for helpful comments. B. Cowgill thanks the Kauffman Foundation. Earlier versions of this paper were titled “Matching for Strategic Organizations,” “Preferences and Productivity in Job Matching,” “Designing Organizational Versus Public Markets,” and “Matchmaking Principals: Theory and Evidence from Internal Labor Markets.”