Executive Compensation Limits and Executive Turnover

References

• Abudy M, Amiram D, Rozenbaum O, Shust E (2020) Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment. J. Bank. Finance 114:1–16.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bartlett R, Partnoy F (2020) The misuse of Tobin’s q. Vanderbilt Law Rev. 73(2):353–424.Google Scholar
• Bebchuk LA, Fried JM (2005) Pay without performance: Overview of the issues. J. Appl. Corporate Finance 17(4):8–23.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bertrand M, Mullainathan S (2003) Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences. J. Political Econom. 111(5):1043–1075.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bradshaw M, Liao G, Ma M (2019) Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major shareholder. J. Accounting Econom. 67(2–3):255–277.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cao J, Pan X, Tian G (2011) Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China’s listed firms. J. Corporate Finance 17(3):541–554.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cao X, Lemmon M, Pan X, Qian M, Tian G (2019) Political promotion, CEO incentives, and the relationship between pay and performance. Management Sci. 65(7):2947–2965.Link, Google Scholar
• Cary E (2013) Reforming China’s state-owned enterprises. Accessed November 6, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/reforming-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/.Google Scholar
• Cebon P, Hermalin BE (2015) When less is more: The benefits of limits on executive pay. Rev. Financial Stud. 28(6):1667–1700.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen CJP, Li Z, Su X, Yao Y (2012) Delegation and sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance within business groups: Evidence from China. J. Accounting Public Policy 31(6):553–574.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen D, Chen X, Wan H (2005) Regulation and non-pecuniary compensation in Chinese SOEs. Econom. Res. J. 2:92–101.Google Scholar
• Chen R, El Ghoul S, Guedhami O, Nash R (2018) State ownership and corporate cash holdings. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 53(5):1–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Z, Guan Y, Ke B (2013) Are stock option grants to directors of state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong genuine compensation? Accounting Rev. 88(5):1547–1574.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cheng Q, Lee J, Shevlin T (2016) Internal governance and real earnings management. Accounting Rev. 91(4):1051–1085.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cheng Q, Ranasinghe T, Zhao S (2017) High CEO pay ratios: Governance failure or superior performance. Working paper, Singapore Management University, Singapore.Google Scholar
• Core JE, Guay W, Larcker DF (2008) The power of the pen and executive compensation. J. Financial Econom. 88(1):1–25.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Correa R, Lel U (2016) Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. J. Financial Econom. 122(3):500–520.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Du F, Tang GL, Young SM (2012) Influence activities and favoritism in subjective performance evaluation: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises. Accounting Rev. 87(5):1555–1588.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edmans A, Gabaix X, Jenter D (2017) Executive compensation: A survey of theory and evidence. Hermalin BE, Weisbach MS, eds. Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance (Elsevier, Oxford, UK), 383–539.Google Scholar
• Fan JPH, Wong TJ, Zhang T (2012) Institutions and organizational structure: The case of state-owned corporate pyramids. J. Law Econom. Organ. 29(6):1217–1252.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fernandes N, Ferreira MA, Matos P, Murphy KJ (2013) Are U.S. CEOs paid more? New international evidence. Rev. Financial Stud. 26(2):323–367.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ferri F, Maber DA (2013) Say on pay votes and CEO compensation: Evidence from the UK. Rev. Finance 17(2):527–563.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Focke F, Maug E, Niessen-Ruenzi A (2017) The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. J. Financial Econom. 123(2):313–336.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gabaix X, Landier A (2008) Why has CEO pay increased so much? Quart. J. Econom. 123(1):49–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heider F, Ljungqvist A (2015) As certain as debt and taxes: Estimating the tax sensitivity of leverage from state tax changes. J. Financial Econom. 118(3):684–712.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):74–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econom. 3(4):305–360.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC, Murphy KJ (1990) Performance pay and top management incentives. J. Political Econom. 98(2):225–264.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jenter D, Lewellen K (2021) Performance-induced CEO turnover. Rev. Financial Stud. 34(2):569–617.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kato TK, Long C (2006) Executive turnover and firm performance in China. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(2):363–367.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ke B, Rui O, Yu W (2011) Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled Chinese firms. Rev. Accounting Stud. 17(1):166–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim J-B, Li B, Liu Z, Zhang L (2019) Debtor-creditor relationship and corporate tax planning: Evidence from initiation of credit default swaps trading. Working paper, Singapore Management University, Singapore.Google Scholar
• Kuhnen CM, Niessen A (2012) Public opinion and executive compensation. Management Sci. 58(7):1249–1272.Link, Google Scholar
• Larcker DF, Ormazabal G, Taylor DJ (2011) The market reaction to corporate governance regulation. J. Financial Econom. 101(2):431–448.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazear EP, Rosen S (1981) Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. J. Political Econom. 89(5):841–864.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li Q, Lin C, Xu L (2020) Political investment cycles of state-owned enterprises. Rev. Financial Stud. 33(7):3088–3129.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lin Y, Peters F, Seo H (2022) Enforceability of noncompetition agreements and forced turnovers of chief executive officers. J. Law Econom. 65(1):177–209.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luo W, Zhang Y, Zhu N (2011) Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market. J. Corporate Finance 17(2):352–370.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Montinola G, Qian Y, Weingast B (1995) Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for economic success in China. World Politics 48(1):50–81.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy KJ (1985) Corporate performance and managerial remuneration. J. Accounting Econom. 7(1–3):11–42.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy KJ (2013) Regulating banking bonuses in the European Union: A case study in unintended consequences. Eur. Financial Management 19(4):631–657.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murphy KJ, Jensen MC (2018) The politics of pay: The unintended consequences of regulating executive compensation. J. Law Finance Accounting 3(2):189–242.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pan Y (2017) The determinants and impact of executive-firm matches. Management Sci. 63(1):185–200.Link, Google Scholar
• Pan Y, Dai Y, Wei S (2011) Do institutional investors collude with listed companies: Analysis based on non-voluntary management turnover. Nankai Management Rev. 14(02):69–81.Google Scholar
• Perry T, Zenner M (2001) Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts. J. Financial Econom. 62(3):453–488.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Petersen MA (2009) Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Rev. Financial Stud. 22(1):435–480.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Qin X, Fang J, Yu C (2019) Stock price crash and CEO turnover. Finance Res. 26(02):45–59.Google Scholar
• Rose NL, Wolfram C (2002) Regulating executive pay: Using the tax code to influence chief executive officer compensation. J. Labor Econom. 20(S2):S138–S175.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rosen S (1981) The economics of superstars. Amer. Econom. Rev. 71(5):845–858.Google Scholar
• Rosen S (1982) Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. RAND J. Econom. 13(2):311–323.Google Scholar
• Shipman JE, Swanquist QT, Whited RL (2017) Propensity score matching in accounting research. Accounting Rev. 92(1):213–244.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sun Q, Tong WHS (2003) China share issue privatization: The extent of its success. J. Financial Econom. 70(2):183–222.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Terviö M (2008) The difference that CEOs make: An assignment model approach. Amer. Econom. Rev. 98(3):642–668.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thanassoulis J (2012) The case for intervening in bankers’ pay. J. Finance 67(3):849–895.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang K, Xiao X (2009) Ultimate government control structures and firm value: Evidence from Chinese listed companies. China J. Accounting Res. 2(1):101–122.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang K, Xiao X (2011) Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China. J. Accounting Public Policy 30(1):89–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang X, Fan G, Hu L (2018) China’s Provincial Marketization Index Report (Social Science Literature Press, Beijing, China).Google Scholar
• Wong TJ (2016) Corporate governance research on listed firms in China: Institutions, governance and accountability. Foundations Trends Accounting 9(4):259–326.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yang R, Wang Y, Nie H (2013) The political promotion of quasi-government officers: Evidence from Central State Owned Enterprises in China. Management World 3:23–33.Google Scholar