Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard, and Default Risk

References

• Bebchuk LA, Fried JM (2009) Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Ben-Porath E, Dekel E, Lipman BL (2019) Mechanisms with evidence: Commitment and robustness. Econometrica 87(2):529–566.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Biais B, Mariotti T, Plantin G, Rochet J-C (2007) Dynamic security design: Convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. Rev. Econom. Stud. 74(2):345–390.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Biais B, Mariotti T, Rochet J-C, Villeneuve S (2010) Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard. Econometrica 78(1):73–118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bull J, Watson J (2004) Evidence disclosure and verifiability. J. Econom. Theory 118(1):1–31.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Clementi GL, Hopenhayn HA (2006) A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics. Quart. J. Econom. 121(1):229–265.Google Scholar
• Crémer J (1995) Arm’s length relationships. Quart. J. Econom. 110(2):275–295.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeMarzo P, Fishman MJ (2007) Optimal long-term financial contracting. Rev. Financial Stud. 20(6):2079–2128.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeMarzo PM, Fishman MJ, He Z, Wang N (2012) Dynamic agency and the q theory of investment. J. Finance 67(6):2295–2340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dye RA (1985) Disclosure of nonproprietary information. J. Accounting Res. 23(1):123–145.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fu S, Krishna RV (2019) Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information. RAND J. Econom. 50(2):418–452.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fuchs W (2007) Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 97(4):1432–1448.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guttman I, Kremer I, Skrzypacz A (2014) Not only what but also when: A theory of dynamic voluntary disclosure. Amer. Econom. Rev. 104(8):2400–2420.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart S, Kremer I, Perry M (2017) Evidence games: Truth and commitment. Amer. Econom. Rev. 107(3):690–713.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jung W-O, Kwon YK (1988) Disclosure when the market is unsure of information endowment of managers. J. Accounting Res. 26(1):146–153.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Koessler F, Perez-Richet E (2019) Evidence reading mechanisms. Soc. Choice Welfare 53(3):375–397.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lawrence A, Sloan R, Sun Y (2013) Non-discretionary conservatism: Evidence and implications. J. Accounting Econom. 56(2–3):112–133.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leung E, Veenman D (2018) Non-GAAP earnings disclosure in loss firms. J. Accounting Res. 56(4):1083–1137.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Manso G, Strulovici B, Tchistyi A (2010) Performance-sensitive debt. Rev. Financial Stud. 23(5):1819–1854.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marinovic I, Varas F (2016) No news is good news: Voluntary disclosure in the face of litigation. RAND J. Econom. 47(4):822–856.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meyer MA, Vickers J (1997) Performance comparisons and dynamic incentives. J. Political Econom. 105(3):547–581.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Orlov D (2022) Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts. J. Econom. Theory 206:105–550.Google Scholar
• Piskorski T, Westerfield MM (2016) Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring. J. Econom. Theory 166:242–281.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prat A (2005) The wrong kind of transparency. Amer. Econom. Rev. 95(3):862–877.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rampini A, Viswanathan S (2010) Collateral, risk management, and the distribution of debt capacity. J. Finance 65:2293–2322.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Skinner DJ (1994) Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. J. Accounting Res. 32(1):38–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Smith CW, Warner JB (1979) On financial contracting: An analysis of bond contracts. J. Financial Econom. 7:117–161.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Smolin A (2021) Dynamic evaluation design. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconomics 13(4):300–331.Google Scholar
• Verrecchia RE (1983) Discretionary disclosure. J. Accounting Econom. 5:179–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhu JY (2019) Better monitoring … worse productivity? Working paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT.Google Scholar