Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard, and Default Risk

The authors thank Dan Bernhardt, Jeremy Bertomeu, Davide Cianciaruso, Michael Gofman, Sebastian Gryglewicz (discussant), Yunzhi Hu (discussant), Ron Kaniel, Ilan Kremer, Alfred Lehar (discussant), Meg Meyer, Mario Milone, Alan Moreira, Dmitry Orlov, Heikki Rantakari, Adriano Rampini, Amoray Riggs-Cragun (discussant), Kevin Smith, Martin Szydlowski (discussant), Felipe Varas (discussant), Vish Viswanathan, Neng Wang, Ming Yang, and Pavel Zryumov as well as the participants at Corporate Finance Day (Liège), Calgary (Haskayne), American Finance Association (San Diego), Accounting Research Webinar (virtual), Midwest Finance Association, Stony Brook, Tsinghua (PBC School of Finance), Northern Finance Association (Vancouver), University of Illoinois Urbana Champaign, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Asdian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Xiamen), Society for Financial Studies Cavalcade (Carnegie-Mellon University), University of North Carolina Junior Finance Roundtable, Finance Theory Group (Kellogg), FTG Summer (London Business School), Oxford (Nuffield College), Center for Research in Economic theory and applications (Warwick), Society of Economic Dynamics (Mexico City), North American Meeting of the Econometric Society (Davis), Midwest Workshop in Economic Theory (Drexel), and the Alberta School of Business Accounting and Economics Society Webinar. This work was previously circulated under the title “Voluntary disclosure under dynamic moral hazard.”