Frontiers in Operations: You, Me, or We? Coproductive Principal-Agent Dynamics

References

• Aghion P, Tirole J (1997) Formal and real authority in organizations. J. Political Econom. 105(1):1–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alchian AA, Demsetz H (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization. Amer. Econom. Rev. 62(5):777–795.Google Scholar
• Andritsos DA, Tang CS (2018) Incentive programs for reducing readmissions when patient care is co-produced. Production Oper. Management 27(6):999–1020.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baiman S, Fischer PE, Rajan MV (2000) Information, contracting, and quality costs. Management Sci. 46(6):776–789.Link, Google Scholar
• Bastani H, Cachon GP (2025) The human-AI contracting paradox. Preprint, submitted December 29, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5962739.Google Scholar
• Bellos I, Kavadias S (2019) When should customers control service delivery? Implications for service design. Production Oper. Management 28(4):890–907.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bellos I, Kavadias S (2021) Service design for a holistic customer experience: A process framework. Management Sci. 67(3):1718–1736.Link, Google Scholar
• Bergemann D, Hege U (1998) Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning. J. Bank. Finance 22(6–8):703–735.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhaskaran SR, Krishnan V (2009) Effort, revenue, and cost sharing mechanisms for collaborative new product development. Management Sci. 55(7):1152–1169.Link, Google Scholar
• Bhattacharyya S, Lafontaine F (1995) Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts. RAND J. Econom. 26(4):761–781.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonatti A, Hörner J (2011) Collaborating. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(2):632–663.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cachon G (2003) Supply chain coordination with contracts. Graves SC, de Kok AG, eds. Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management, vol. 11 (Elsevier B.V., North Holland), 227–339.Google Scholar
• Cachon GP, Lariviere MA (2005) Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Sci. 51(1):30–44.Link, Google Scholar
• Candoğan ST, Korpeoglu CG, Tang CS (2025) Implications of team submissions in open innovation contests. IMA J. Management Math. 36(1):1–19.Google Scholar
• Carroll G (2015) Robustness and linear contracts. Amer. Econom. Rev. 105(2):536–563.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Casamatta C (2003) Financing and advising: Optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists. J. Finance 58(5):2059–2085.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chan TH, Mihm J, Sosa M (2021) Revisiting the role of collaboration in creating breakthrough inventions. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 23(5):1005–1024.Link, Google Scholar
• Chi T (1996) Performance verifiability and output sharing in collaborative ventures. Management Sci. 42(1):93–109.Link, Google Scholar
• Corbett CJ, DeCroix GA (2001) Shared-savings contracts for indirect materials in supply chains: Channel profits and environmental impacts. Management Sci. 47(7):881–893.Link, Google Scholar
• Corbett CJ, DeCroix GA, Ha AY (2005) Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: Linear contracts and double moral hazard. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 163(3):653–667.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Crama P, De Reyck B, Taneri N (2017) Licensing contracts: Control rights, options, and timing. Management Sci. 63(4):1131–1149.Link, Google Scholar
• Crama P, Sting FJ, Wu Y (2019) Encouraging help across projects. Management Sci. 65(3):1408–1429.Link, Google Scholar
• de Bettignies JE (2008) Financing the entrepreneurial venture. Management Sci. 54(1):151–166.Link, Google Scholar
• Dong M, Mayskaya T, Smirnov V, Taylor O, Wait A (2025) Optimal skill diversity in teams. Econom. Theory (November 22), https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-025-01690-0.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1984) The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and hungry look. Amer. Econom. Rev. 74(2):361–366.Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Game Theory (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Fügener A, Walzner DD, Gupta A (2026) Roles of artificial intelligence in collaboration with humans: Automation, augmentation, and the future of work. Management Sci. 72(1):538–557.Link, Google Scholar
• Gale D, Nikaidô H (1965) The Jacobian matrix and global univalence of mappings. Math. Ann. 159(2):81–93.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gaynor M, Gertler P (1995) Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships. RAND J. Econom. 26(5):591–613.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Georgiadis G (2014) Projects and team dynamics. Rev. Econom. Stud. 82(1):187–218.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Georgiadis G, Lippman SA, Tang CS (2014) Project design with limited commitment and teams. RAND J. Econom. 45(3):598–623.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gerchak Y, Wang Y (2004) Revenue-sharing vs. wholesale-price contracts in assembly systems with random demand. Production Oper. Management 13(1):23–33.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econom. 94(4):691–719.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hagiu A, Wright J (2019) Controlling vs. enabling. Management Sci. 65(2):577–595.Link, Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10(1):74–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B (1982) Moral hazard in teams. Bell J. Econom. 13(2):324–340.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B, Milgrom P (1987) Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55(2):303–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B, Milgrom P (1991) Multitask principal–agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. J. Law Econom. Organ. 7(special issue):24–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmström B, Milgrom P (1994) The firm as an incentive system. Amer. Econom. Rev. 84(4):972–991.Google Scholar
• Itoh H (2001) Job design and incentives in hierarchies with team production. Hitotsubashi J. Commerce Management 36(1):1–17.Google Scholar
• Jones BF (2021) The rise of research teams: Benefits and costs in economics. J. Econom. Perspective 35(2):191–216.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamm JB, Nurick AJ (1993) The stages of team venture formation: A decision-making model. Entrepreneurship Theory Practice 17(2):17–27.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kaptay G (2020) The k-index is introduced to replace the h-index to evaluate better the scientific excellence of individuals. Heliyon 6(7):e04415.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Karmarkar US, Pitbladdo R (1995) Service markets and competition. J. Oper. Management 12(3–4):397–411.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kavadias S, Sommer SC (2009) The effects of problem structure and team diversity on brainstorming effectiveness. Management Sci. 55(12):1899–1913.Link, Google Scholar
• Keeney RL, Raiffa H (1976) Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs (Wiley, New York).Google Scholar
• Kim SH, Netessine S (2013) Collaborative cost reduction and component procurement under information asymmetry. Management Sci. 59(1):189–206.Link, Google Scholar
• Kim SK, Wang S (1998) Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard. J. Econom. Theory 82(2):342–378.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee MY, Edmondson AC (2017) Self-managing organizations: Exploring the limits of less-hierarchical organizing. Res. Organ. Behav. 37:35–58.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marinucci M (2009) Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners. J. Econom. 97:141–163.Google Scholar
• Moyer M (2016) Slicing Pie Handbook: Perfect Equity Splits for Startups (Lake Shark Ventures, Lake Forest, IL).Google Scholar
• Nandeibam S (2002) Sharing rules in teams. J. Econom. Theory 107(2):407–420.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast CJ (1995) A theory of responsibility in organizations. J. Labor Econom. 13(3):387–400.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prendergast C (2002) The tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives. J. Political Econom. 110(5):1071–1102.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Radner R (1993) The organization of decentralized information processing. Econometrica 61(5):1109–1146.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rahmani M, Roels G, Karmarkar US (2017) Collaborative work dynamics in projects with co‐production. Production Oper. Management 26(4):686–703.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rahmani M, Roels G, Karmarkar US (2018) Team leadership and performance: Combining the roles of direction and contribution. Management Sci. 64(11):5234–5249.Link, Google Scholar
• Roels G (2014) Optimal design of coproductive services: Interaction and work allocation. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 16(4):578–594.Link, Google Scholar
• Roels G, Karmarkar US, Carr S (2010) Contracting for collaborative services. Management Sci. 56(5):849–863.Link, Google Scholar
• Sampson RC (2007) R&D alliances and firm performance: The impact of technological diversity and alliance organization on innovation. Acad. Management J. 50(2):364–386.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Siemsen E, Balasubramanian S, Roth AV (2007) Incentives that induce task-related effort, helping, and knowledge sharing in workgroups. Management Sci. 53(10):1533–1550.Link, Google Scholar
• Singh J, Fleming L (2010) Lone inventors as sources of breakthroughs: Myth or reality? Management Sci. 56(1):41–56.Link, Google Scholar
• Van Mieghem JA (1999) Coordinating investment, production, and subcontracting. Management Sci. 45(7):954–971.Link, Google Scholar
• Vargo SL, Lusch RF (2004) Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing. J. Marketing 68(1):1–17.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang S, Zhou H (2004) Staged financing in venture capital: Moral hazard and risks. J. Corporate Finance 10(1):131–155.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Winter E (2004) Incentives and discrimination. Amer. Econom. Rev. 94(3):764–773.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wuchty S, Jones BF, Uzzi B (2007) The increasing dominance of teams in production of knowledge. Science (1979) 316(5827):1036–1039.Google Scholar
• Xiao W, Xu Y (2012) The impact of royalty contract revision in a multistage strategic R&D alliance. Management Sci. 58(12):2251–2271.Link, Google Scholar
• Yoo OS, Roels G, Corbett CJ (2016) The time–Money trade-off for entrepreneurs: When to hire the first employee? Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 18(4):559–569.Link, Google Scholar