Flexibility and Reputation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

Dorothée Honhon
Dorothée Honhon
[email protected]
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4538-3936
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
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,
Kyle Hyndman
Corresponding Author
Kyle Hyndman
[email protected]
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3666-8734
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
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Dorothée Honhon

Dorothée Honhon

[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4538-3936

Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080

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,

Corresponding Author

Kyle Hyndman

[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3666-8734

Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080

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Published Online:3 Jun 2020https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3495

Supplemental Material

mnsc.2019.3495.sm1.pdf

The replication files for this article are available HERE.

cover image Management Science

Volume 66, Issue 11

November 2020

Pages v, 4921-5484, iii-iv

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Received:June 13, 2018
Accepted:September 02, 2019
Published Online:June 03, 2020

Copyright © 2020, INFORMS

Cite as

Dorothée Honhon, Kyle Hyndman (2020) Flexibility and Reputation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. Management Science 66(11):4998-5014.

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3495

Keywords