Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Different Priority Rules: The Role of Information

The authors appreciate the detailed and helpful comments from an associate editor and three anonymous reviewers that helped improve the paper. The authors thank Nick Arnosti, Tim Cason, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki, Atsushi Kajii, Rongzhu Ke, Paola Manzini, Joel Sobel, Satoru Takahashi, Utku Ünver, Shmuel Zamir, and seminar and conference participants at the 2017 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Tenth Bi-Annual Conference on Economic Design, East Asian Game Theory Conference 2017, European Meeting of the Economic Science Association 2017, the 18th SAET Conference on Current Trends in Economics, the 2018 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, and Hong Kong Baptist University for helpful comments and discussions. The authors also thank Feifei Lin and Min Fang for superb research assistance. This paper is a combination of two papers. The first is the previously circulated paper titled “Organ donation decisions under different allocation rules: Theory and experiment,” and the second is a new study assessing the effect of information on the incentive to register as a deceased organ donor. All errors are our own.