Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets

The authors thank Santiago Balseiro, Ozan Candogan, Roberto Cominetti, Nikhil Devanur, Yoni Gur, Renato Paes Leme, Marco Scarsini, and Marc Schroder for useful discussions on the technical content of this paper. In addition, the authors extend thanks to the review team of Management Science; conference program committee members and reviewers at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation; participants at Duke Computer Science-Economics seminar, Michigan Ross, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Operations Research Center, and Stanford Graduate School of Business; and attendees of the AAMAS-IJCAI workshop on Agents and Incentives in Artificial Intelligence, the Artificial Intelligence and Marketing Science workshop at the AAAI Conference on Artificial Inteligence, the Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science workshop at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, the Barbados Algorithmic Game Theory workshop, the International Conference on Game Theory, and the Schloss Dagstuhl seminar on Traffic Models. Their remarks and questions allowed the authors to significantly improve the manuscript and its presentation. This work was done while C. Kroer and C. A. Wilkens were working full time at the Core Data Science team at Meta.