This paper, as a working paper Stoumbos RC (2019), was titled “How Does More Frequent Reporting Reduce Information Asymmetry?” and formed part of the author’s dissertation at Yale School of Management. The author thanks the members of the dissertation committee, Jake Thomas (chair), Frank Zhang, Shyam Sunder, and Marina Niessner for guidance, support, and encouragement; participants at the Carnegie Mellon University Emerging Scholars Symposium and at workshops at Columbia University, Emory University, London Business School, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Toronto, University of British Columbia, George Washington University, and Yale University; Benedikt Downar, Juergen Ernstberger, Aytekin Ertan, Zeqiong Huang, Steve Karolyi, Peter Kelly, Alina Lerman, Thomas Steffen, Heather Tookes, Huai Zhang, and fellow PhD students at Yale for helpful comments; Rongchen Li for research assistance; and the editorial team for suggestions that dramatically improved the paper. All errors and omissions are the author’s own.
