Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing
Published Online:23 Aug 2023https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899
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Volume 70, Issue 7
July 2024
Pages vi, 4167-4952, iii-v
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- Received:March 25, 2021
- Accepted:March 26, 2023
- Published Online:August 23, 2023
Copyright © 2023, INFORMS
Cite as
Bernhard Kasberger, Karl H. Schlag (2023) Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing. Management Science 70(7):4219-4235.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4899
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The authors thank Paul Heidhues, Fabian Herweg, Jacob Goeree, Paul Klemperer, Itzhak Rasooly, József Sákovics, and Kyle Woodward as well as the participants at the 2016 Auction and Market Design Workshop in Vienna, the 2017 Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) Workshop on Market Design, the 2017 Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, the 2017 European Economic Association and Econometric Society European meeting (EEA-ESEM) meeting in Lisbon, the 2018 Austrian Economic Association (NOeG) annual meeting, the 2018 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) conference, the Nuffield Economic Theory Workshop, the 2019 Verein für Socialpolitik (VfS) annual conference, the 2019 INFORMS annual meeting, and the 2019 NOeG winter meeting for their comments. The authors also thank the editors and the reviewers for their constructive comments, which have considerably improved the paper.
