Directors’ Incentives from Potential Penalties: Evidence from Their Voting
Published Online:3 Jun 2026https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06141
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The replication files for this article are available HERE.
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- Received:May 17, 2024
- Accepted:April 16, 2025
- Published Online:June 03, 2026
Copyright © 2026, INFORMS
Cite as
Wenzhi (Dave) Ding, Chen Lin, Thomas Schmid, Michael S. Weisbach (2026) Directors’ Incentives from Potential Penalties: Evidence from Their Voting. Management Science 0(0).
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06141
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The authors are grateful to Jeff Coles, Eduard Inozemtsev, Ye Li, Lian Liu, Michelle Lowry, Victor Lyonnet, Yihui Pan, René Stulz, Daisy Wang, Tracy Wang, Michael Wittry, Xiaoyun Yu, and Kai Li as well as seminar participants at Financial Management Association Annual Meeting, Indiana, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Minnesota, Ohio State, and South Carolina for helpful suggestions.
