Costly Rewards Sustain Cooperation with Imperfect Monitoring
- Jingjing Pan,
- Jianbiao Li,
Jianbiao Li
[email protected]School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China; and Reinhard Selten Laboratory, China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
- Xiaofei Niu ,
Xiaofei Niu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3430-2774
School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
- Chengkang Zhu
Corresponding Author
Chengkang Zhu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5909-5241
School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Jianbiao Li
[email protected]School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China; and Reinhard Selten Laboratory, China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
Xiaofei Niu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3430-2774
School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Corresponding Author
Chengkang Zhu
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5909-5241
School of Economics, Institute for Study of Brain-Like Economics, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
Supplemental Material
The replication files for this article are available HERE.

