Bargaining and Contract Forms in Distribution Channels: Why Do Slotting Fees Arise and Linear Contracts Persist?

Øystein Foros
Øystein Foros
[email protected]
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1945-5139
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), 5045 Bergen, Norway
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Hans Jarle Kind
Hans Jarle Kind
[email protected]
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7056-2656
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), 5045 Bergen, Norway; and CESifo, 81679 Munich, Germany
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Greg Shaffer
Corresponding Author
Greg Shaffer
[email protected]
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3112-7189
University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627
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Øystein Foros

[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1945-5139

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), 5045 Bergen, Norway

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,

Hans Jarle Kind

Hans Jarle Kind

[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7056-2656

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), 5045 Bergen, Norway; and CESifo, 81679 Munich, Germany

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,

Corresponding Author

Greg Shaffer

[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3112-7189

University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627

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Published Online:23 Oct 2026https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.03426

Supplemental Material

mnsc.2025.03426.sm1.pdf

The replication files for this article are available HERE.

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Received:August 15, 2025
Accepted:August 04, 2026
Published Online:October 23, 2026

Copyright © 2026, INFORMS

Cite as

Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, Greg Shaffer (2026) Bargaining and Contract Forms in Distribution Channels: Why Do Slotting Fees Arise and Linear Contracts Persist?. Management Science 0(0).

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.03426

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Acknowledgments

The authors thank Preyas Desai, Ganesh Iyer, Kinshuk Jerath, Dominique Lauga, Z. John Zhang, and participants at the Marketing Theory Seminar Series for helpful comments. A previous version of this paper was titled “Nash-in-Nash Bargaining with Price-Setting Firms: Contracts, Profits, and the Role of Slotting Fees.”