The Design of Optimal Pay-as-Bid Procurement Mechanisms
- Je-ok Choi ,
Je-ok Choi
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3849-4259
Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford School of Engineering, Stanford, California 94305;
- Daniela Saban ,
Corresponding Author
Daniela Saban
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5217-4112
Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305
- Gabriel Weintraub
Gabriel Weintraub
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-507X
Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305
Je-ok Choi
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3849-4259
Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford School of Engineering, Stanford, California 94305;
Corresponding Author
Daniela Saban
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5217-4112
Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305
Gabriel Weintraub
[email protected]https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6111-507X
Operations, Information & Technology, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California 94305
