The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Published Online:1 Dec 2011https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0979
Supplemental Material
opre.1110.0979-sm-ec.pdf (273 KB)
- Cited by
- 17 February 2026 | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 14, No. 1
- 26 October 2023 | Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and Reliability, Vol. 238, No. 6
- 12 April 2023 | Operations Research, Vol. 72, No. 1
- 2 December 2022 | International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 52, No. 1
- European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 301, No. 3
- 13 May 2020 | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 8, No. 2
- Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 119, No. 3
- 23 April 2018 | Foundations and Trends® in Technology, Information and Operations Management, Vol. 12, No. 1
- 10 October 2016 | ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 5, No. 1
- 14 July 2016 | Operations Research, Vol. 64, No. 6
- 26 July 2015 | Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 39-40, No. 1
- European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 239, No. 1
- 13 February 2013 | Water Resources Management, Vol. 27, No. 7
- 14 November 2012 | Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 38, No. 1
Volume 59, Issue 6
November-December 2011
Pages iii-1561
Article Information
Supplemental Material
Metrics
Information
- Received:September 01, 2009
- Accepted:April 01, 2011
- Published Online:December 01, 2011
Copyright © 2011, INFORMS
Cite as
Tobias Harks, Konstantin Miller, (2011) The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games. Operations Research 59(6):1491-1503.
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0979
Keywords
