Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility

• Santiago R. Balseiro

  Santiago R. Balseiro

  [email protected]

  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0012-3292

  Department of Decision, Risk, and Operations, Columbia Business School, New York, New York 10027;

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  ,
• Omar Besbes

  Omar Besbes

  [email protected]

  https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2982-3794

  Department of Decision, Risk, and Operations, Columbia Business School, New York, New York 10027;

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  ,
• Francisco Castro

  Corresponding Author

  Francisco Castro

  [email protected]

  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0766-3491

  Department of Decisions, Operations & Technology Management, Anderson School of Management, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095

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