Does It Pay to Shroud In-App Purchase Prices?

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2019.0835

References

  • Acquisti A, Varian H (2005) Conditioning prices on purchase history. Marketing Sci. 24(3):367–381.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bhargava HK, Choudhary V (2008) Research note: When is versioning optimal for information goods? Management Sci. 54(5):1029–1035.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Brown J, Hossain T, Morgan J (2010) Shrouded attributes and information suppression: Evidence from the field. Quart. J. Econom. 125(2):859–876.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Brynjolfsson E, Dick A, Smith M (2004). Search and product differentiation at an internet shopbot. Working Paper 194, Massachusetts Insitute of Technology, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  • Chao Y, Derdenger T (2013) Mixed bundling in two-sided markets in the presence of installed base effects. Management Sci. 59(8):1904–1926.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Cheng HK, Li S, Liu Y (2014) Optimal software free trial strategy: Limited version, time-locked, or hybrid? Production Oper. Management 24(3):504–517.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Chetty R, Looney A, Kroft K (2009) Salience and taxation: Theory and evidence. Amer. Econom. Rev. 99(4):1145–1177.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Choudhary V (2009) Use of pricing schemes for differentiating information goods. Inform. Systems Res. 21(1):78–92.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Derdenger T, Liu X, Sun B (2012) An empirical analysis of consumer purchase behavior of base products and add-ons. Working paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  • Dewan R, Jing B, Seidmann A (2003) Product customization and price competition on the internet. Management Sci. 49(8):1055–1070.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Dou Y, Hu Y, Wu D (2017) Selling or leasing? Pricing information goods with depreciation of consumer valuation. Inform. Systems Res. 28(3):585–602.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Ellison G (2005) A model of add-on pricing. Quart. J. Econom. 120(2):585–637.Google Scholar
  • Ellison G, Ellison S (2009) Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the internet. Econometrica 77(2):427–452.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Fishbein M, Ajzen I (1975) Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA).Google Scholar
  • Gabaix X, Laibson D (2006) Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets. Quart. J. Econom. 121(2):505–540.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ghosh B, Balachander S (2007) Competitive bundling and counterbundling with generalist and specialist firms. Management Sci. 53(1):159–168.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Gupta A, Stahl D, Whinston AB (1997) A stochastic equilibrium model of internet pricing. J. Econom. Dynamics Control 21(4–5):697–722.Google Scholar
  • Kyle AS (1985) Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53(6):1315–1336.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lal R, Matutes C (1994) Retail pricing and advertising strategies. J. Bus. 67(3):345–370.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Nalebuff B (2004) Bundling as an entry barrier. Quart. J. Econom. 119(1):159–187.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Niculescu MF, Wu DJ (2014) Economics of free under perpetual licensing: Implications for the software industry. Inform. Systems Res. 25(1):173–199.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Rayner K (1998) Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research. Psych. Bull. 124(3):372–422.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shulman J, Geng X (2013) Add-on pricing by asymmetric firms. Management Sci. 59(4):899–917.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Simon H (1955) A behavioral model of rational choice. Quart. J. Econom. 69(1):99–118.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Sullivan B (2007) Gotcha Capitalism: How Hidden Fees Rip You Off Every Day, and What You Can Do About It (Ballantine Books, New York).Google Scholar
  • Sundararajan A (2004) Nonlinear pricing of information goods. Management Sci. 50(12):1660–1673.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Van der Lans R, Pieters R, Wedel M (2008) Eye-movement analysis of search effectiveness. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 103(482):452–461.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Verboven F (1999) Product line rivalry and market segmentation—with an application to automobile optional engine pricing. J. Indust. Econom. 47(4):399–425.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.