Another Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
Published Online:16 Oct 2009https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1081
Supplemental Material
mnsc.1090.1081-sm-ec.pdf (218 KB)
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Andreas Fuster
[email protected]Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Stephan Meier
[email protected]Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Andreas Fuster
[email protected]Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Stephan Meier
[email protected]Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; and Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts 02210
mnsc.1090.1081-sm-ec.pdf (218 KB)

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