Rejoinder: Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation
Published Online:7 Nov 2023https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2022.0423
Abstract
We discuss the sales compensation design problem in [Rubel O, Prasad A (2016) Dynamic incentives in sales force compensation. Marketing Sci. 35(4):676–689]; hereafter RP16, under the comments given by [Kong X, Cheng Q, Yu Y (2023) Commentary on “Dynamic incentives in sales force compensation”. Marketing Sci. 43(1):229–231]. Using the solution procedure of RP16, we show that the optimal compensation plan is concave, as in RP16, when the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion is high, but it remains to be fully solved when the agent’s coefficient of risk aversion is low. Some directions for the latter case are provided.
History: K. Sudhir served as the senior editor.
