Costly Collusion in Differentiated Industries

References

• Abreu D. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. J. Econom. Theory (1986) 39:191–228Crossref, Google Scholar
• Abreu D. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting. Econometrica (1988) 56:383–396Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ailawadi K., Kopalle P., Neslin S. Predicting competitive response to a major policy change: Combining game theoretic and empirical analyses. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(1):12–24Link, Google Scholar
• Athey S., Bagwell K. Optimal collusion with private information. RAND J. Econom. (2001) 32:428–465Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bhardwaj P. Delegating pricing decisions. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(2):143–169Link, Google Scholar
• Borenstein S., Shepard A. Dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets. RAND J. Econom. (1996) 27(3):429–451Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chang M.-H. The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1991) 9:453–469Crossref, Google Scholar
• Connor J. M.Global Price Fixing: Our Customers Are the Enemy (2001) (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deneckere R. Duopoly supergames with product differentiation. Econom. Lett. (1983) 11:37–43Crossref, Google Scholar
• Donsimoni M. P. Stable heterogeneous cartels. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1985) 3:451–467Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dubé J. P., Manchanda P. Differences in dynamic brand competition across markets: An empirical analysis. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(1):81–95Link, Google Scholar
• Friedman J. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1971) 38:1–12Crossref, Google Scholar
• Friedman J., Thisse J.-F. Partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24:631–645Crossref, Google Scholar
• Genesove D., Mullin W. Testing static oligopoly models: Conduct and cost in the sugar industry, 1890–1914. RAND J. Econom. (1998) 29(2):355–377Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gollop F. M., Roberts M. J. Firm interdependence in oligopolistic markets. J. Econometrics (1979) 1:313–331Crossref, Google Scholar
• Häckner J. Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1994) 12:155–177Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hay G., Kelley D. An empirical survey of price fixing conspiracies. J. Law Econom. (1974) 17:13–38Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jehiel P. Product differentiation and price collusion. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1992) 10:633–641Crossref, Google Scholar
• Knittel C., Stango V. Price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion: Evidence from the credit card market. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2003) 93:1703–1729Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lal R. Price promotions: Limiting competitive encroachment. Marketing Sci. (1990) 9(3):247–262Link, Google Scholar
• Levenstein M., Suslow V. What determines cartel success? J. Econom. Lit. (2006) 44(1):43–95Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mishra B., Prasad A. Delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets with symmetric and asymmetric information. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24:490–497Link, Google Scholar
• Nevo A. Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Econometrica (2001) 69:307–342Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ross T. Cartel stability and product differentiation. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. (1992) 10:1–13Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rothschild R. On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies. Econom. Lett. (1992) 40:33–37Crossref, Google Scholar
• Scherer F. M., Ross D.Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (1990) 3rd ed.(Houghton Mifflin Company, New York) Google Scholar
• Slade M. E. Vancouver's gasoline-price wars: An empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1992) 59:257–276Crossref, Google Scholar
• Slade M. E. Market power and joint dominance in UK brewing. J. Indust. Econom. (2004) 52:133–163Crossref, Google Scholar
• Soberman D., Gatignon H. Research issues at the boundary of competitive dynamics and market evolution. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24:165–174Link, Google Scholar
• Spiller P. T., Favaro E. The effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction: The Uruguayan banking sector. RAND J. Econom. (1984) 15:244–254Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sudhir K. Competitive pricing behavior in the auto market: A structural analysis. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(1):42–60Link, Google Scholar
• Tyagi R. On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion. Managerial Decision Econom. (1999) 20:293–298Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wolfram C. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1999) 89:805–826Crossref, Google Scholar