Dynamic Incentives in Sales Force Compensation

References

• Albers S, Mantrala MK (2008) Models for sales management decisions. Wierenga B, ed. Handbook of Marketing Decision Models (Springer, Berlin).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Albers S, Mantrala MK, Sridhar S (2010) Personal selling elasticities: A meta-analysis. J. Marketing Res. 47(5):840–853.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aravindakshan A, Naik PA (2011) How does awareness evolve when advertising stops. Marketing Lett. 22(3):315–326.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barnes L (1986) Finding the best compensation plan. Sales Marketing Management 138(August):47.Google Scholar
• Başar T (1999) Nash equilibria of risk-sensitive nonlinear stochastic differential games. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 100(3):479–498.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Basu AK, Kalyanaram G (1990) On the relative performance of linear versus nonlinear compensation plans. Internat. J. Res. Marketing 7(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Basu AK, Lal R, Srinivasan V, Staelin R (1985) Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Sci. 4(4): 267–291.Link, Google Scholar
• Bensoussan A, Elliott RJ (1995) A finite-dimensional risk-sensitive control problem. SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(6):1834–1846.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beswick CA (1977) Allocating selling effort via dynamic programming. Management Sci. 23(7):667–678.Link, Google Scholar
• Caldieraro F, Coughlan AT (2009) Sales force compensation with a state variable: The case of pharmaceutical detailing. Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle.Google Scholar
• Churchill GA, Ford NM, Walker O (1996) Sales Force Management, 5th ed. (Homewood, Irwin, IL).Google Scholar
• Coughlan AT, Joseph K (2012) Sales force compensation: Research insights and research potential. Lilien GL, Grewal R, eds. Handbook of Business-to-Business Marketing (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK), 473–495.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Darmon RY (1978) Optimal salesmen’s compensation plans: A multiperiod approach. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 29(11):1061–1069.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farris P, Shames ER, Reibstein DJ (1998) Advertising Budgeting: A Report from the Field (American Association of Advertising Agencies, New York).Google Scholar
• Hauser JR, Simester D, Wernerfelt B (1994) Customer satisfaction incentives. Marketing Sci. 13(4):327–350.Link, Google Scholar
• Hauser JR, Simester D, Wernerfelt B (1996) Internal customers and internal suppliers. J. Marketing Res. 33(4):268–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B (1979) Moral hazard and observability. Bell J. Econom. 10:74–91.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holmstrom B, Milgrom P (1987) Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives. Econometrica 55:303–328.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jacobson DH (1973) Optimal stochastic linear systems with exponential criteria and their relation to deterministic differential game. IEEE Trans. Automatic Control Ac-18:124–131.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jørgensen S, Zaccour G (2004) Differential Games in Marketing, Internat. Series Quant. Marketing (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Joseph K, Kalwani M (1998) The role of bonus pay in salesforce compensation plans. Indust. Marketing Management 27:147–159.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krishnamoorthy A, Misra S, Prasad A (2005) Scheduling sales force training: Theory and evidence. Internat. J. Res. Marketing 22:427–440.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laffont JJ, Martimort D (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lal R, Srinivasan V (1993) Compensation plans for single- and multi-product salesforces: An application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom model. Management Sci. 39(7):777–793.Link, Google Scholar
• Mantrala MK, Raman K (1990) Analysis of salesforce-incentive plan for accurate sales forecasting and performance. Internat. J. Res. Marketing 7:189–202.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mantrala MK, Raman K, Desiraju R (1997) Sales quota plans: Mechanisms for adaptive learning. Marketing Lett. 8:393–405.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E, Tirole J (2001) Markov perfect equilibrium I. Observable actions. J. Econom. Theory 101:191–219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Murthy P, Mantrala MK (2005) Allocation a promotion Duget between advertising and sales contest prizes: An integrated marketing communications perspective. Marketing Lett. 16(1):21–43.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Naik PA, Raman K (2003) Understanding the impact of synergy on multimedia communications. J. Marketing Res. 40(4):375–388.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nerlove M, Arrow KJ (1962) Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions. Economica 29(114):129–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Prasad A, Sethi SP (2005) Competitive advertising under uncertainty: A stochastic differential game approach. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 123(1):163–185.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sannikov Y (2008) A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem. Rev. Econom. Stud. 75:957–984.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sinha P, Zoltners AA (2001) Sales-force decision models: Insights from 25 years of implementation. Interfaces 31(3):S8–S44.Link, Google Scholar
• Spear SE, Srivastava S (1987) On repeated moral hazard with discounting. Rev. Econom. Stud. 54:599–617.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tapiero CS, Farley JU (1975) Optimal control of sales force effort in time. Management Sci. 21(9):976–985.Link, Google Scholar
• Whittle P (1986) The risk-sensitive certainty equivalence principle. J. Appl. Probab. 23:383–388.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williams N (2011) Persistent private information. Econometrica 79: 1233–1275.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williams N (2013) On dynamic principal-agent problems in continuous time. Working paper, University of Wisconsin, Madison.Google Scholar
• Zoltners AA, Sinha P, Lorimer SE (2006) The Complete Guide to Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans That Work (American Management Association, New York).Google Scholar