Licensing and Price Competition in Tied-Goods Markets: An Application to the Single-Serve Coffee System Industry

References

• Ackerberg DA, Rysman M (2005) Unobserved product differentiation in discrete-choice models: Estimating price elasticities and welfare effects. RAND J. Econom. 36(4):771–788.Google Scholar
• Berry S, Levinsohn J, Pakes A (1995) Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econometrica 63(4):841–890.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berry ST (1994) Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. RAND J. Econom. 25(2):242–262.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Besanko D, Gupta S, Jain D (1998) Logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior: An equilibrium framework. Management Sci. 44(11-part-1):1533–1547.Link, Google Scholar
• Borenstein S, Mackie-Mason JK, Netz JS (2000) Exercising market power in proprietary aftermarkets. J. Econom. Management Strategy 9(3):157–188.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bronnenberg BJ, Rossi PE, VilcassimNJ (2005) Structural modeling and policy simulation. J. Marketing Res. 42(1):22–26.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Che H, Sudhir K, Seetharaman PB (2007) Bounded rationality in pricing under state-dependent demand: Do firms look ahead, and if so, how far? J. Marketing Res. 44(3):434–449.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chintagunta PK, Vilcassim NJ (1995) A two-period repeated game advertising investment model for oligopolistic markets with an application to the beer industry. Decision Sci. 26(4):531–559.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Derdenger T (2014) Technological tying and the intensity of price competition: An empirical analysis of the video game industry. Quant. Marketing Econom. 12(2):127–165.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Derdenger T, Kumar V (2013) The dynamic effects of bundling as a product strategy. Marketing Sci. 32(6):827–859.Link, Google Scholar
• Dubé J-PH, Hitsch GJ, Chintagunta PK (2010) Tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects. Marketing Sci. 29(2):216–249.Link, Google Scholar
• Economides N (1989) Desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities. Amer. Econom. Rev. 79(5):1165–1181.Google Scholar
• Erdem T, Imai S, Keane MP (2003) Brand and quantity choice dynamics under price uncertainty. Quant. Marketing Econom. 1(1):5–64.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farrell J, GalliniNT (1988) Second-sourcing as a commitment: Monopoly incentives to attract competition. Quart. J. Econom. 103(4):673–694.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farrell J, Monroe HK, Saloner G (1998) The vertical organization of industry: Systems competition versus component competition. J. Econom. Management Strategy 7(2):143–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Franses PH (2005) On the use of econometric models for policy simulation in marketing. J. Marketing Res. 42(1):4–14.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gallini NT (1984) Deterrence by market sharing: A strategic incentive for licensing. Amer. Econom. Rev. 74(5):931–941.Google Scholar
• Gowrisankaran G, Rysman M (2012) Dynamics of consumer demand for new durable goods. J. Political Econom. 120(6):1173–1219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hartmann WR, Nair HS (2010) Retail competition and the dynamics of demand for tied goods. Marketing Sci. 29(2):366–386.Link, Google Scholar
• Hoch SJ, Bradlow ET, Wansink B (1999) The variety of an assortment. Marketing Sci. 18(4):527–546.Link, Google Scholar
• Katz ML, Shapiro C (1985) Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. Amer. Econom. Rev. 75(3):424–440.Google Scholar
• Kim J, Allenby GM, Rossi PE (2002) Modeling consumer demand for variety. Marketing Sci. 21(3):229–250.Link, Google Scholar
• Kong P, Ellickson PB, Lovett MJ (2016) Putting the horses before the cart: Harnessing the power of partner brands. Working paper, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.Google Scholar
• Lee RS (2013) Vertical integration and exclusivity in platform and two-sided markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(7):2960–3000.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levene H (1952) On the power function of tests of randomness based on runs up and down. Ann. Math. Statist. 23(1):34–56.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li H (2015) Intertemporal price discrimination with complementary products: E-books and e-readers. Working paper, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
• Lin X (2017) Disaggregate network effects on two-sided platforms. Working paper, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago.Google Scholar
• Liu H (2010) Dynamics of pricing in the video game console market: Skimming or penetration? J. Marketing Res. 47(3):428–443.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Madansky A (1988) Prescriptions for working statisticians. Springer Texts in Statistics (Springer, New York).Google Scholar
• Mariñoso BG (2001) Technological incompatibility, endogenous switching costs and lock-in. J. Indust. Econom. 49(3):281–298.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Matutes C, Regibeau P (1988) “Mix and match”: Product compatibility without network externalities. RAND J. Econom. 19(2):221–234.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nair HS (2007) Intertemporal price discrimination with forward-looking consumers: Application to the US market for console video-games. Quant. Marketing Econom. 5(3):239–292.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nevo A (2001) Measuring market power in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. Econometrica 69(2):307–342.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Petrin A (2002) Quantifying the benefits of new products: The case of the minivan. J. Political Econom. 110(4):705–729.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rockett KE (1990) Choosing the competition and patent licensing. RAND J. Econom. 21(1):161–171.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rust J (1987) Optimal replacement of GMC bus engines: An empirical model of Harold Zurcher. Econometrica 55(5):999–1033.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shapiro C (1994) Aftermarkets and consumer welfare: Making sense of Kodak. Antitrust Law J. 63(63):483–511.Google Scholar
• Shepard A (1987) Licensing to enhance demand for new technologies. RAND J. Econom. 18(3):360–368.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sinkinson M (2016) Pricing and entry incentives with exclusive contracts. Working paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.Google Scholar
• Skrainka B, Judd KL (2011) High performance quadrature rules: How numerical integration affects a popular model of product differentiation. CeMMAP working papers CWP03/11, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.Google Scholar
• Staiger D, Stock JH (1997) Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica 65(3):557–586.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sun B, Xie J, Cao HH (2004) Product strategy for innovators in markets with network effects. Marketing Sci. 23(2):243–254.Link, Google Scholar