Innovation and the Durable Goods Monopolist: The Optimality of Frequent New-Version Releases

References

• Amaldoss W., Rapoport A. Collaborative product and market development: Theoretical implications and experimental evidence. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(3):396–414Link, Google Scholar
• Arya A., Mittendorf B. Benefits of channel discord in the sale of durable goods. Marketing Sci. (2006) 25(1):91–96Link, Google Scholar
• Ausubel L. M., Deneckere R. J. Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly. Econometrica (1989) 57(3):511–531Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bayus B. L. The dynamic pricing of next generation consumer durables. Marketing Sci. (1992) 11(3):251–265Link, Google Scholar
• Bayus B. L., Jain S., Rao A. G. Too little, too early: Introduction timing and new product performance in the personal digital assistant industry. J. Marketing Res. (1997) 34(1):50–63Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bond E. W., Samuelson L. Durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales. RAND J. Econom. (1984) 15(3):336–345Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J. I. Durable-goods monopolists. J. Political Econom. (1982) 90(2):314–332Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bulow J. An economic theory of planned obsolescence. Quart. J. Econom. (1986) 101(4):729–750Crossref, Google Scholar
• Butz D. A. Durable-good monopoly and best-price provisions. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1990) 80(5):1062–1076Google Scholar
• Choi J. P. Network externality, compatibility choice, and planned obsolescence. J. Indust. Econom. (1994) 42(2):167–182Crossref, Google Scholar
• Coase R. H. Durability and monopoly. J. Law Econom. (1972) 15(1):143–149Crossref, Google Scholar
• Desai P. S., Purohit D. Competition in durable goods markets: The strategic consequences of leasing and selling. Marketing Sci. (1999) 18(1):42–58Link, Google Scholar
• Dhebar A. Durable-goods monopolists, rational consumers, and improving products. Marketing Sci. (1994) 13(1):100–120Link, Google Scholar
• Ellison G., Fudenberg D. The Neo-Luddites lament: Too many upgrades in the software industry. RAND J. Econom. (2000) 31:253–272Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D., Tirole J. Upgrades, tradeins, and buybacks. RAND J. Econom. (1998) 29(2):235–258Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greenbaum J. This just in: Consumers have their software vendors. Intelligent Enterprise, San Mateo (2005) 8(10):14Google Scholar
• Greene J. Mad as hell at Microsoft: A new lincensing plan is ticking off lots of corporate buyers. Bus. Week (2002) 3804, October 21):68Google Scholar
• Gul F., Sonnenschein H., Wilson R. Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture. J. Econom. Theory (1986) 39(1):155–190Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hauser J., Tellis G. J., Griffin A. Research on innovation: A review and agenda for marketing science. Marketing Sci. (2006) 25(6):687–717Link, Google Scholar
• Kahn C. The durable goods monopolist and consistency with increasing costs. Econometrica (1986) 54(2):275–294Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kamien M. I., Schwartz N. L. Market structure and innovation: A survey. J. Econom. Literature (1975) 13(1):1–37Google Scholar
• Karp L. S., Perloff J. M. The optimal suppression of a low-cost technology by a durable-good monopoly. RAND J. Econom. (1996) 27(2):346–364Crossref, Google Scholar
• Katz M. L., Shapiro C. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1985) 75(3):424–440Google Scholar
• Levinthal D. A., Purohit D. Durable goods and product obsolescence. Marketing Sci. (1989) 8(1):35–56Link, Google Scholar
• Li X. Cheap talk and Bogus network externalities in the emerging technology market. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24:531–543Link, Google Scholar
• Mitra D., Golder P. N. How does objective quality affect perceived quality? Short-term effects, long-term effects, and asymmetries. Marketing Sci. (2006) 25(3):230–247Link, Google Scholar
• Padmanabhan V., Rajiv S., Srinivasan K. New products, upgrades, and new releases: A rationale for sequential product introduction. J. Marketing Res. (1997) 34(4):456–472Crossref, Google Scholar
• Purohit D. Exploring the relationship between the markets for new and used durable goods: The case of automobiles. Marketing Sci. (1992) 11(2):154–167Link, Google Scholar
• Reinganum J. F. Practical implications of game theoretic models of R&D. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1984) 74(2):61–66Google Scholar
• Shugan S. M. Editorial: Marketing science, models, mono- poly models, and why we need them. Marketing Sci. (2002) 21(3):223–228Link, Google Scholar
• Shugan S. M., Xie J. Advance pricing of services and other implications of separating purchase and consumption. J. Service Res. (2000) 2(3):227–239Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shugan S. M., Xie J. Advance-selling as a competitive marketing tool. Internat. J. Res. Marketing (2005) 22(3):351–373Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stenzel J. The MS-Word 6 upgrade and its impacts: Reflections on cost, cause and effect, and IT culture. (1997) . http://stenzel.ucdavis.edu/word6.htmGoogle Scholar
• Stokey N. L. Rational expectations and durable goods pricing. Bell J. Econom. (1981) 12(1):112–128Crossref, Google Scholar
• Waldman M. A new perspective on planned obsolescence. Quart. J. Econom. (1993) 108(1):273–283Crossref, Google Scholar
• Waldman M. Planned obsolescence and the R&D decision. RAND J. Econom. (1996) 27(3):583–595Crossref, Google Scholar
• Waldman M. Durable goods theory for real world markets. J. Econom. Perspectives (2003) 17(1):131–154Crossref, Google Scholar
• Xie J., Shugan S. M. Electronic tickets, smart cards, and online prepayments: When and how to advance sell. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(3):219–243Link, Google Scholar