Equilibrium Returns Policies in the Presence of Supplier Competition

References

• Bazaraa M. S., Sherali H. D., Shetty C. M.Nonlinear Programming: Theory and Algorithms (1983) 2nd ed.(John Wiley & Sons, New York) Google Scholar
• Butz D. A. Vertical price controls with uncertain demand. J. Law Econom. (1997) 40(2):433–459Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Fisher M. Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information. Management Sci. (2000) 46(8):1032–1048Link, Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Lariviere M. A. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations. Management Sci. (2005) 51(1):30–44Link, Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Zipkin P. H. Competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two-stage supply chain. Management Sci. (1999) 45(7):936–953Link, Google Scholar
• Çetinkaya S., Parlar M. Optimal myopic policy for a stochastic inventory problem with fixed and proportional backorder costs. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (1998) 110(1):20–41Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen F. Auctioning supply contracts. Management Sci. (2007) 53(10):1562–1576Link, Google Scholar
• Coughlan A. T. Competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice: Theory and application. Marketing Sci. (1985) 4(2):110–129Link, Google Scholar
• Coughlan A. T., Wernerfelt B. On credible delegation by oligopolists: A discussion of distribution channel management. Management Sci. (1989) 35(2):226–239Link, Google Scholar
• Coughlan A. T., Anderson E., Stern L. W., El-Ansary A.Marketing Channels (2006) 7th ed.(Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ) Google Scholar
• Dana J. D., Spier K. E. Revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental industry. J. Indust. Econom. (2001) 49(3):223–245Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dasgupta P., Maskin E. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, I: Theory. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1986) 53(1):1–26Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deneckere R., Marvel H. P., Peck J. Demand uncertainty and price maintenance: Markdowns as destructive competition. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1997) 87(4):619–641Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E. Vertical restraints with incomplete information. J. Indust. Econom. (1991) 39(5):503–516Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E. Vertical integration in oligopoly. J. Law, Econom., Organ. (1992) 8(2):377–393Google Scholar
• Granot D., Yin S. On the effectiveness of returns policies in the price-dependent newsvendor model. Naval Res. Logist. (2005) 52(8):765–779Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grocery Manufacturers Association Powering growth through direct store delivery. (2008) . Report version 1.1 (September), http://www.gmabrands.com/publications/DSD_Final_111108.pdfGoogle Scholar
• Jap S. D. An exploratory study of the introduction of online reverse auctions. J. Marketing (2003) 67(3):96–107Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jeuland A. P., Shugan S. M. Managing channel profits. Marketing Sci. (1983) 2(3):239–272Link, Google Scholar
• Jeuland A. P., Shugan S. M. Reply to: “Managing channel profits: Comment”. Marketing Sci. (1988) 7(1):103–106Link, Google Scholar
• Kandel E. The right to return. J. Law Econom. (1996) 39(1):329–356Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kuik R., van Nunen J. A. E. E., Coenen J., Flapper S. D. P., van Nunen J. A. E. E., Van Wassenhove L. N. Commercial returns of sun-protection products: The L'Oréal France case. Managing Closed-Loop Supply Chains (2005) (Springer, Berlin) 79–86Part 4Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lal R., Staelin R. An approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy. Management Sci. (1984) 30(12):1524–1539Link, Google Scholar
• Lariviere M. A., Porteus E. L. Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contract. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management (2001) 3(4):293–305Link, Google Scholar
• Lau A. H. L., Lau H.-S., Wang J.-C. How a dominant retailer might design a purchase contract for a newsvendor-type product with price-sensitive demand. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (2007) 190(2):443–458Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mantrala M. K., Raman K. Demand uncertainty and supplier's returns policies for a multi-store style-good retailer. Eur. J. Oper. Res. (1999) 115(2):270–284Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marvel H. P., Peck J. Demand uncertainty and returns policies. Internat. Econom. Rev. (1995) 36(3):691–714Crossref, Google Scholar
• McGuire T. W., Staelin R. An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration. Marketing Sci. (1983) 2(2):161–191Link, Google Scholar
• McGuire T. W., Staelin R., Bucklin L. P., Carmen J. M. Channel efficiency, incentive compatibility, transfer pricing and market structure. Research in Marketing: Distribution Channels and Institutions (1986) 8(JAI Press, Greenwich, CT) 181–223Google Scholar
• Monahan J. P. A quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits. Management Sci. (1984) 30(6):720–726Link, Google Scholar
• Moorthy K. S. Managing channel profits: Comment. Marketing Sci. (1987) 6(4):375–379Link, Google Scholar
• Moorthy K. S. Strategic decentralization in channels. Marketing Sci. (1988) 7(4):335–355Link, Google Scholar
• Padmanabhan V., Png I. P. L. Manufacturer's return policies and retail competition. Marketing Sci. (1997) 16(1):81–94Link, Google Scholar
• Padmanabhan V., Png I. P. L. Reply to “Do returns policies intensify retail competition?”. Marketing Sci. (2004) 23(4):614–618Link, Google Scholar
• Pasternack B. A. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities. Marketing Sci. (1985) 4(2):166–176Link, Google Scholar
• Pasternack B. A. Commentary—Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities. Marketing Sci. (2008a) 27(1):131–132Link, Google Scholar
• Pasternack B. A. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities. Marketing Sci. (2008b) 27(1):133–140Link, Google Scholar
• Paul A. On the unimodality of the manufacturer's objective function in the newsvendor model. Oper. Res. Lett. (2006) 34(1):46–48Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pellegrini L., Pellegrini L., Reddy S. K. Sale or return agreements vs outright sales. Marketing Channels: Relationships and Performance (1986) (Lexington Books, Lexington, MA) 59–72Google Scholar
• Rey P., Tirole J. The logic of vertical restraints. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1986) 76(5):921–939Google Scholar
• Sarvary M., Padmanabhan V. The informational role of manufacturer returns policies: How they can help in learning the demand. Marketing Lett. (2001) 12(4):341–350Crossref, Google Scholar
• Scherer F. M., Ross D.Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (1980) (Houghton-Miffin, Boston) Google Scholar
• Shugan S. M. Implicit understandings in channels of distribution. Management Sci. (1985) 31(4):435–460Link, Google Scholar
• Shugan S. M. Editorial—Introduction to the special classics issue. Marketing Sci. (2008) 27(1):9–11Link, Google Scholar
• Simon L. K. Games with discontinuous payoffs. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 54(4):569–597Crossref, Google Scholar
• Taylor T. A., Xiao W. Incentives for retailer forecasting: Rebates vs. returns. Management Sci. (2009) 55(10):1654–1669Link, Google Scholar
• Tsay A. A. Managing retail channel overstock: Markdown money and return policies. J. Retailing (2001) 77(4):457–492Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wang H. Do returns policies intensify retail competition? Marketing Sci. (2004) 23(4):611–613Link, Google Scholar
• Weng Z. K. Channel coordination and quantity discounts. Management Sci. (1995) 41(9):1509–1522Link, Google Scholar
• Weng Z. K., Wong R. T. General models for the supplier's all-unit quantity discount policy. Naval Res. Logist. (1993) 40(7):971–991Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E.Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1983) (Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1998) (Free Press, New York) Google Scholar