Cross-Market Discounts

References

• Adams W. J., Yellen J. L. Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly. Quart. J. Econom. (1976) 90(3):475–498Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ailawadi K. L., Neslin S. A. The effect of promotion on consumption. J. Marketing Res. (1998) 35(3):390–398Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arya A., Mittendorf B., Yoon D.-H. Friction in related-party trade when a rival is also a customer. Management Sci. (2008) 54(11):1850–1860Link, Google Scholar
• Bell D. R., Iyer G., Padmanabhan V. Price competition under stockpiling and flexible consumption. J. Marketing Res. (2002) 39(3):292–303Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brickman P., Campbell D. T., Appley M. H. Hedonic relativism and planning the good society. Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium (1971) (Academic Press, New York) 287–302Google Scholar
• Chandon P., Wansink B. When are stockpiled products consumed faster? A convenience–salience framework of postpurchase consumption incidence and quantity. J. Marketing Res. (2002) 39(3):321–335Crossref, Google Scholar
• Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) Consumer expenditures in 2007. (2009) . Report 1016, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
• Coombs C. H., Avrunin G. S. Single-peaked functions and the theory of preference. Psych. Rev. (1977) 84(2):216–230Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dhar S., Raju J. S. The effects of cross-ruff coupons on sales and profits. Management Sci. (1998) 44(11, Part 1):1501–1516Link, Google Scholar
• Excentus Excentus Corporation and Safeway Inc. settle lawsuit and enter into patent licensing agreement. (2010) . Retrieved May 2, 2010, http://www.excentus.com/index.php?mod=content&id=138&p=1Google Scholar
• Gans J. S., King S. P. Supermarkets and shopper dockets: The Australian experience. Australian Econom. Rev. (2004) 37(3):311–316Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gans J. S., King S. P. Paying for loyalty: Product bundling in oligopoly. J. Indust. Econom. (2006) 54(1):43–62Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hess J. D., Gerstner E. Loss leader pricing and rain check policy. Marketing Sci. (1987) 6(4):358–374Link, Google Scholar
• Jerath K., Zhang Z. J. Store within a store. J. Marketing Res. (2010) 47(4):748–763Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lal R., Matutes C. Retail pricing and advertising strategies. J. Bus. (1994) 67(3):345–370Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lindeman T. F. Giant Eagle bags a bigger share of market. Pittsburgh Post Gazette (2007) February 14). http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07045/761852-28.stmGoogle Scholar
• Kim B.-D., Shi M., Srinivasan K. Reward programs and tacit collusion. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(2):99–120Link, Google Scholar
• Mas-Colell A., Whinston M. D., Green J. R.Microeconomic Theory (1995) (Oxford University Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Mathewson F., Winter R. Tying as a response to demand uncertainty. RAND J. Econom. (1997) 28(3):566–583Crossref, Google Scholar
• Matutes C., Regibeau P. Compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly. J. Indust. Econom. (1992) 40(1):37–54Crossref, Google Scholar
• McTaggart J. Pump up the volume. Progressive Grocer (2006) September 1):20–26Google Scholar
• Montgomery A. L., Bradlow E. T. Why analyst overconfidence about the functional form of demand can lead to overpricing. Marketing Sci. (1999) 18(4):569–583Link, Google Scholar
• Neslin S. A.Sales Promotion (2002) (Marketing Science Institute, Cambridge, MA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Oren S. S., Smith S. A., Wilson R. B. Competitive nonlinear tariffs. J. Econom. Theory (1983) 29(1):49–71Crossref, Google Scholar
• Progressive Grocer P. A. attorney general OKs Giant Eagle's fuelperks! discounts. (2005) September 7). http://www.progressivegrocer.com/top-story-p.a._attorney_general_oks_giant_eagle_s_fuelperks_discounts-24797.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Progressive Grocer Taking the lead: High-level executives from among the top operators envision where their companies will venture in the coming year. (2006) May 1):30–46Google Scholar
• Robbins T. Higher prices mean slimmer profits for gas stations. NPR Morning Edition (2008) May 15). http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90453142Google Scholar
• Singh N., Vives X. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. RAND J. Econom. (1984) 15(4):546–554Crossref, Google Scholar
• Slade M. E. The leverage theory of tying revisited: Evidence from newspaper advertising. Southern Econom. J. (1998) 65(2):204–222Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spence A. M. Nonlinear prices and welfare. J. Public Econom. (1977) 8(1):1–18Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stremersch S., Tellis G. J. Strategic bundling of products and prices: A new synthesis for marketing. J. Marketing (2002) 66(1):55–72Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sun B. Promotion effect on endogenous consumption. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(3):430–443Link, Google Scholar
• Tellis G. J. Strategic bundling of products and prices: A new synthesis for marketing. J. Marketing (1986) 50(4):146–160Crossref, Google Scholar
• Varian H. R.Microeconomic Analysis (1992) 3rd ed.(W. W. Norton and Company, New York) Google Scholar
• Venkatesh R., Kamakura W. Optimal bundling and pricing under a monopoly: Contrasting complements and substitutes from independent valued products. J. Bus. (2003) 76(2):211–231Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wansink B. Can package size accelerate usage volume? J. Marketing (1996) 60(3):1–14Crossref, Google Scholar
• Winer R. S.Pricing (2006) (Marketing Science Institute, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar