Procuring Commodities: First-Price Sealed-Bid or English Auctions?

References

• Abbas A. E., Hann I.-H. Measuring risk aversion in a name-your-own-price channel. Decision Anal. (2010) 7(1):123–136Link, Google Scholar
• Armantier O., Treich N. Star-shaped probability weighting functions and overbidding in first-price auctions. Econom. Lett. (2009a) 104(2):83–85Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armantier O., Treich N. Subjective probabilities in games: An application to the overbidding puzzle. Internat. Econom. Rev. (2009b) 50(4):1079–1102Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bajari P., Hortacsu A. Are structural estimates of auction models reasonable? Evidence from experimental data. J. Political Econom. (2005) 113(4):703–741Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barrett G. F., Donald S. G. Consistent tests for stochastic dominance. Econometrica (2003) 71(1):71–104Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berg J., Dickhaut J., McCabe K. Risk preference instability across institutions: A dilemma. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA (2005) 102(11):4209–4214Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bradlow E. T., Park Y.-H. Bayesian estimation of bid sequences in Internet auctions using a generalized record-breaking model. Marketing Sci. (2007) 26(2):218–229Link, Google Scholar
• Brown J., Hossain T., Morgan J. Shrouded attributes and information suppression: Evidence from the field. Quart. J. Econom. (2010) 125(2):859–876Crossref, Google Scholar
• Camerer C. F., Ho T.-H. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica (1999) 67(4):827–874Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cantillon E. The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions. Games Econom. Behav. (2008) 61(1):1–25Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chafkin M. Reverse auctions: A supplier's survival guide. Inc. (2007) April 25). http://inc.com/inctr/2007/04/reverse-auctions-a-suppliers-survival-guide.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Chan T. Y., Kadiyali V., Park Y.-H. Willingness to pay and competition in online auctions. J. Marketing Res. (2007) 44(2):324–333Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen K.-Y., Plott C. R. Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. (1998) 25(1):34–78Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen-Ritzo C.-H., Harrison T. P., Kwasnica A. M., Thomas D. J. Better, faster, cheaper: An experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback. Management Sci. (2005) 51(12):1753–1762Link, Google Scholar
• Coppinger V. M., Smith V. L., Titus J. A. Incentives and behavior in English, Dutch, and sealed-bid auctions. Econom. Inquiry (1980) 18(1):1–22Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cox J., Oaxaca R. L., Issac R. M. Is bidding behavior consistent with bidding theory for private value auctions? Research in Experimental Economics (1996) Vol. 6(JAI Press, Greenwich, CT) 131–148Google Scholar
• Cox J. C., Roberson B., Smith V. L., Smith V. L. Theory and behavior of single object auctions. Research in Experimental Economics (1982) Vol. 2(JAI Press, Greenwich, CT) 537–579Google Scholar
• Crawford V. P., Iriberri N. Level-k auctions: Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions? Econometrica (2007) 75(6):1721–1770Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dholakia U. M., Simonson I. The effect of explicit reference points on consumer choice and online bidding behavior. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(2):206–217Link, Google Scholar
• Dittrich D. A. V., Guth W., Kocher M., Pezanis-Christou P. Loss aversion and learning to bid. Economica (2011) . ePub ahead of print August 18Google Scholar
• Elmaghraby W. Auctions within e-sourcing events. Production Oper. Management (2007) 16(4):409–422Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Katok E. Regret in auctions: Theory and evidence. Econom. Theory (2007) 33(1):81–101Crossref, Google Scholar
• Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Katok E. Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Management Sci. (2008) 54(4):808–819Link, Google Scholar
• Fay S. Partial-repeat-bidding in the name-your-own-price channel. Marketing Sci. (2004) 23(3):407–418Link, Google Scholar
• Filiz-Ozbay E., Ozbay E. Y. Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2007) 97(4):1407–1418Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goeree J., Holt C. A., Palfrey T. R. Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions. J. Econom. Theory (2002) 104(1):247–272Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guerre E., Perrigne I., Vuong Q. Nonparametric identification of risk aversion in first-price auctions under exclusion restrictions. Econometrica (2009) 77(4):1193–1227Crossref, Google Scholar
• Guth W., Ivanova-Stenzel R., Konigstein M., Strobel M. Learning to bid—An experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games. Econom. J. (2003) 113(487):477–494Google Scholar
• Haruvy E., Katok E. An experimental investigation of buyer determined procurement auctions. (2008) . Working paper, Pennsylvania State University, University Park.Google Scholar
• Hendricks K., Porter R. H. An empirical study of an auction with asymmetric information. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1988) 78(5):865–883Google Scholar
• Holt C. A. Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures. J. Political Econom. (1980) 88(3):433–445Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hossain T., Morgan J. …Plus shipping and handling: Revenue (non) equivalence in field experiments on eBay. B. E. J. Econom. Anal. Policy (2006) 6(2). http://works.bepress.com/john_morgan/1Google Scholar
• Hui S. K., Fader P. S., Bradlow E. T. Path data in marketing: An integrative framework and prospectus for model building. Marketing Sci. (2009) 28(2):320–335Link, Google Scholar
• James D., Reagle D., Anderssen R. S., Braddock R. D., Newham L. T. H. Experience weighted attraction in the first price auction and Becker Degroot Marschak. 18th World IMACS Congress MODSIM09 Internat. Congress Modelling Simulation (2009) (Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand and International Association for Mathematics and Computers in Simulation)1437–1441Google Scholar
• Jap S. D. Online reverse auctions: Issues, themes, and prospects for the future. J. Acad. Marketing Sci. (2002) 30(4):506–525Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jap S. D. The impact of online reverse auction design on buyer-supplier relationships. J. Marketing (2007) 71(1):146–159Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jap S. D., Haruvy E. Interorganizational relationships and bidding behavior in industrial online reverse auctions. J. Marketing Res. (2008) 45(5):550–561Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jap S. D., Naik P. A. BidAnalyzer: A method for estimation and selection of dynamic bidding models. Marketing Sci. (2008) 27(6):949–960Link, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Kagel J. H., Roth A. E. Auctions: A survey of experimental research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) 501–586Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Levin D. Independent private value auctions: Bidder behavior in first-, second-, and third-price auctions with varying numbers of bidders. Econom. J. (1993) 103(419):868–879Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Levin D., Durlauf S. N., Blume L. E. Auctions: Experiments. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2008) 2nd ed.(Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK) . DOI:10.1087/9780230226203.0072Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kagel J. H., Levin D., Kagel J. H., Roth A. E. Auctions: A survey of experimental research 1995–2008. The Handbook of Experimental Economics (2012) Vol. 2(Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Kirchkamp O., Reiss J. P. Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidders—Theory and experiment. (2008) . Jena Economic Research Paper 2008-066, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Jena, GermanyGoogle Scholar
• Krasnokutskaya E. Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2011) 78(1):293–327Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krishna V.Auction Theory (2002) (Academic Press, London) Google Scholar
• Laffont J.-J., Ossard H., Vuong Q. Econometrics of first-price auctions. Econometrica (1995) 63(4):953–980Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levy H. Stochastic dominance and expected utility: Survey and analysis. Management Sci. (1992) 38(4):555–593Link, Google Scholar
• Lucking-Reiley D. Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the Internet. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1999) 89(5):1063–1080Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E. S., Riley J. G. Asymmetric auctions. Rev. Econom. Stud. (2000) 67(3):413–438Crossref, Google Scholar
• Morgan J., Steiglitz K., Reis G. The spite motive and equilibrium behavior in auctions. B. E. J. Econom. Anal. Policy (2003) 2(1). Article 5Google Scholar
• Myerson R. B. Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. (1981) 6(1):58–73Link, Google Scholar
• Netzer O., Lattin J. M., Srinivasan V. A hidden Markov model of customer relationship dynamics. Marketing Sci. (2008) 27(2):185–204Link, Google Scholar
• Neugebauer T., Perote J. Bidding “as if” risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback. Experiment. Econom. (2008) 11(2):190–202Crossref, Google Scholar
• Neugebauer T., Selten R. Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets. Games Econom. Behav. (2006) 54(1):183–204Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ockenfels A., Selten R. Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. Games Econom. Behav. (2005) 51(1):155–170Crossref, Google Scholar
• Park Y.-H., Bradlow E. T. An integrated model for bidding behavior in Internet auctions: Whether, who, when, and how much. J. Marketing Res. (2005) 42(4):470–482Crossref, Google Scholar
• Parkes D. C., Kalagnanam J. Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions. Management Sci. (2005) 51(3):435–451Link, Google Scholar
• Purchasing E-auction playbook. (2001) June 21):S1–S3Google Scholar
• Rabiner L. R. A tutorial on hidden Markov models and selected applications in speech recognition. Proc. IEEE (1989) 77(2):257–286Crossref, Google Scholar
• Selten R., Buchta J., Budescu D. V., Erev I., Zwick R. Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions. Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amon Rapoport (1998) (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ) 79–102Google Scholar
• Seshadri S., Chatterjee K., Lilien G. L. Multiple source procurement competitions. Marketing Sci. (1991) 10(3):246–263Link, Google Scholar
• Shachat J., Swarthout J. T. Procurement auctions for differentiated goods. Decision Anal. (2010) 7(1):6–22Link, Google Scholar
• Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance (1961) 16(1):8–37Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yao S., Mela C. F. Online auction demand. Marketing Sci. (2008) 27(5):861–885Link, Google Scholar
• Zeithammer R., Adams C. The sealed-bid abstraction in online auctions. Marketing Sci. (2010) 29(6):964–987Link, Google Scholar