Cheap-Talk Advertising and Misrepresentation in Vertically Differentiated Markets

References

• Anand BN, Shachar R. (Noisy) communication. Quant. Marketing Econom. (2007) 5(3):211–237Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anand BN, Shachar R. Targeted advertising as a signal. Quant. Marketing Econom. (2009) 7(3):237–266Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson SP, Renault R. Advertising content. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2006) 96(1):93–113Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson SP, Renault R. The advertising mix for a search good. Management Sci. (2013) 59(1):69–83Link, Google Scholar
• Bagwell K, Armstrong M, Porter R. The economic analysis of advertising. Handbook of Industrial Organization (2007) 3(Elsevier, Amsterdam) 1703–1844Google Scholar
• Bagwell K, Ramey G. Advertising as information: Matching products to buyers. J. Econom. Management Strategy (1993) 2(2):199–243Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chakraborty A, Harbaugh R. Persuasion by cheap talk. Amer. Econom. Rev. (2010) 100(5):2361–2382Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chakraborty A, Harbaugh R. Persuasive puffery. (2013) . Working paper, Indiana University, IndianapolisGoogle Scholar
• Crawford VP, Sobel J. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica (1982) 50(6):1431–1451Crossref, Google Scholar
• Diamond P. A model of price adjustment. J. Econom. Theory (1971) 3(2):156–168Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gerstner E, Hess JD. Can bait and switch benefit consumers? Marketing Sci. (1990) 9(2):114–124Link, Google Scholar
• Hess JD, Gerstner E. Yes, “bait and switch” really benefits consumers. Marketing Sci. (1998) 17(3):283–289Link, Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Soberman D, Villas-Boas JM. The targeting of advertising. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(3):461–476Link, Google Scholar
• Jullien B. Participation constraints in adverse selection models. J. Econom. Theory (2000) 93(1):1–47Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kihlstrom RE, Riordan MH. Advertising as a signal. J. Political Econom. (1984) 92(3):427–450Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kirmani A, Rao AR. No pain, no gain: A critical review of the literature on signaling unobservable product quality. J. Marketing (2000) 64(2):66–79Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kuksov D, Shachar R, Wang K. Advertising and consumers' communications. Marketing Sci. (2013) 32(2):294–309Link, Google Scholar
• Laffont J-J, Martimort D. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2002) (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazear EP. Bait and switch. J. Political Econom. (1995) 103(4):813–830Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lewis TR, Sappington DEM. Countervailing incentives in agency problems. J. Econom. Theory (1989) 49(2):294–313Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maggi G, Rodriguez-Clare A. On countervailing incentives. J. Econom. Theory (1995) 66(1):238–263Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mayzlin D, Shin J. Uninformative advertising as an invitation to search. Marketing Sci. (2011) 30(4):666–685Link, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P, Roberts J. Price and advertising signals of product quality. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(4):796–821Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nelson P. Information and consumer behavior. J. Political Econom. (1970) 78(2):311–329Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stole LA, Armstrong M, Porter R. Price discrimination and competition. Handbook of Industrial Organization (2007) 3(Elsevier, Amsterdam) 2221–2299Google Scholar
• Tirole J. The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas JM. Product variety and endogenous pricing with evaluation costs. Management Sci. (2009) 55(8):1338–1346Link, Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas JM, Schmidt-Mohr U. Oligopoly with asymmetric information: Differentiation in credit markets. RAND J. Econom. (1999) 30(3):375–396Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wernerfelt B. Advertising content when brand choice is a signal. J. Bus (1990) 63(1):91–98Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wilkie WL, Mela CF, Gundlach GT. Does “bait and switch” really benefit consumers? Marketing Sci. (1998) 17(3):273–282Link, Google Scholar