Tailored Cheap Talk: The Effects of Privacy Policy on Ad Content and Market Outcomes

References

• Acquisti A, Taylor C, Wagman L (2016) The economics of privacy. J. Econom. Lit. 54(2):442–492.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Acquisti A, Varian HR (2005) Conditioning prices on purchase history. Marketing Sci. 24(3):367–381.Link, Google Scholar
• Anderson SP, Renault R (2006) Advertising content. Amer. Econom. Rev. 96(1):93–113.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Austen-Smith D, Banks JS (2000) Cheap talk and burned money. J. Econom. Theory 91(1):1–16.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bagwell K (1995) Commitment and observability in games. Games Econom. Behav. 8(2):271–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bagwell K (2018) Commitment with private resolve. Working paper, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.Google Scholar
• Bagwell K, Ramey G (1993) Advertising as information: Matching products to buyers. J. Econom. Management Strategy 2(2):199–243.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barreda IMD (2013) Cheap talk with two-sided private information. Working paper, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.Google Scholar
• Chakraborty A, Harbaugh R (2010) Persuasion by cheap talk. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(5):2361–82.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chakraborty A, Harbaugh R (2014) Persuasive puffery. Marketing Sci. 33(3):382–400.Link, Google Scholar
• Chakravorti B, Spiegel Y (1993) Commitment under imperfect observability. Discussion paper, Bellcore Economics.Google Scholar
• Che Y-K, Dessein W, Kartik N (2013) Pandering to persuade. Amer. Econom. Rev. 103(1):47–79.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chen Y, Narasimhan C, Zhang ZJ (2001) Individual marketing with imperfect targetability. Marketing Sci. 20(1):23–41.Link, Google Scholar
• Crawford VP, Sobel J (1982) Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50(6):1431–1451.Crossref, Google Scholar
• de Cornière A, de Nijs R (2016) Online advertising and privacy. RAND J. Econom. 47(1):48–72.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Deng Y, Mela CF (2018) TV viewing and advertising targeting. J. Marketing Res. 55(1):99–118.Google Scholar
• Durbin E, Iyer G (2009) Corruptible advice. Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconom. 1(2):220–242.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Economist, The (2014) Getting to know you. (September 11), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-online-avidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party.Google Scholar
• Esteban L, Gil A, Hernandez JM (2001) Informative advertising and optimal targeting in a monopoly. J. Indust. Econom. 49(2):161–180.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Farrell J, Gibbons R (1989) Cheap talk with two audiences. Amer. Econom. Rev. 79(5):1214–1223.Google Scholar
• Farrell J, Rabin M (1996) Cheap talk. J. Econom. Perspect. 10(3):103–118.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Filipovich D (2008) Cheap talk on the circle. Report, Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de Mexico.Google Scholar
• Freixas X, Guesnerie R, Tirole J (1985) Planning under incomplete information and the Ratchet effect. Rev. Econom. Stud. 52(2):173–191.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg D, Tirole J (2000) Customer poaching and brand switching. RAND J. Econom. 31(4):634–657.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gardete PM (2013) Cheap-talk advertising and misrepresentation in vertically differentiated markets. Marketing Sci. 32(4):609–621.Link, Google Scholar
• Gardete PM, Guo L (2018) Pre-purchase information acquisition and informative advertising. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.Google Scholar
• Hart OD, Tirole J (1988) Contract renegotiation and Coasian dynamics. Rev. Econom. Stud. 55(4):509–540.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hotelling H (1929) Stability in competition. Econom. J. 39(153):41–57.Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Soberman D, Villas-Boas J (2005) The targeting of advertising. Marketing Sci. 24(3):461–476.Link, Google Scholar
• Kamenica E, Gentzkow M (2011) Bayesian persuasion. Amer. Econom. Rev. 101(6):2590–2615.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kartik N (2007) A note on cheap talk and burned money. J. Econom. Theory 1(136):749–758.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kang C (2017) Congress moves to strike internet privacy rules from Obama era. New York Times (March 23), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/technology/congress-moves-to-strike-internet-privacy-rules-from-obama-era.html.Google Scholar
• Kihlstrom RE, Riordan MH (1984) Advertising as a signal. J. Political Econom. 92(3):427–450.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kreps DM, Wilson R (1982) Sequential equilibria. Econometrica 50(4):863–894.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Levin J, Milgrom P (2010) Online advertising: Heterogeneity and conflation in market design. Amer. Econom. Rev. 100(2):603–607.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lipnowski E, Ravid D (2017) Cheap talk with transparent motives. Working paper, University of Chicago, Chicago.Google Scholar
• Maggi G (1999) The value of commitment with imperfect observability and private information. RAND J. Econom. 30(4):555–574.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin E, Tirole J (2001) Markov perfect equilibrium: I. Observable actions. J. Econom. Theory 100(2):191–219.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mayzlin D, Shin J (2011) Uninformative advertising as an invitation to search. Marketing Sci. 30(4):666–685.Link, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P, Roberts J (1986) Price and advertising signals of product quality. J. Political Econom. 94(4):796–821.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ostrovsky M, Schwarz M (2010) Information disclosure and unraveling in matching markets. Amer. Econom. J. Microeconom. 2(2):34–63.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ottaviani M, Sèrensen PN (2006a) Professional advice. J. Econom. Theory 126(1):120–142.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ottaviani M, Sèrensen PN (2006b) Reputational cheap talk. RAND J. Econom. 37(1):155–175.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rayo L, Segal I (2010) Optimal information disclosure. J. Political Econom. 118(5):949–987.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roy S (2000) Strategic segmentation of a market. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 18(8):1279–1290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sahni NS, Wheeler SC, Chintagunta PK (2018) Personalization in email marketing: The role of non-informative advertising content. Marketing Sci. 37(2):236–258.Google Scholar
• Seidmann DJ (1990) Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests. J. Econom. Theory 50(2):445–458.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shen Q, Villas-Boas JM (2018) Behavioral-based advertising. Management Sci. 64(5):2047–2064.Link, Google Scholar
• Singh S, Dai T (2018) Conspicuous by its absence: Diagnostic expert testing under uncertainty. Working paper, John Hopkins University, Baltimore.Google Scholar
• Snider M (2017) Broadband rules axed by Congress, headed to Trump. USA Today (March 28), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/03/28/broadband-rules-axed-congress-headed-trump/99744078/.Google Scholar
• Sobel J (2016) Lying and deception in games. Working paper, University of California, San Diego, CA.Google Scholar
• Spector D (2000) Pure communication between agents with close preferences. Econom. Lett. 66(2):171–178.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tuchman A, Nair HS, Gardete PM (2018) Television ad-skipping, consumption, complementarities and the consumer demand for advertising. Quant. Marketing Econom. 16(2):111–174.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Van Damme E, Hurkens S (1997) Games with imperfectly observable commitment. Games Econom. Behav. 21(1):282–308.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas JM (1999) Dynamic competition with customer recognition. RAND J. Econom. 30(4):604–631.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas JM (2004) Price cycles in markets with customer recognition. RAND J. Econom. 35(3):486–501.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Watson J (1996) Information transmission when the informed party is confused. Games Econom. Behav. 12(1):143–161.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weitzman ML (1980) The “Ratchet principle” and performance incentives. Bell J. Econom. 11(1):302–308.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wernerfelt B (1990) Advertising content when brand choice is a signal. J. Bus. 63(1):91–98.Crossref, Google Scholar